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PRESIDENTIAL INACTION AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Jeffrey A. Love*
Arpit K. Garg**
Imagine two presidents. The first campaigned on an issue that requires him to
expand the role of the federal government—maybe it was civil rights legisla-
tion or stricter sentencing for federal criminals. In contrast, the second presi-
dent pushes policies—financial deregulation, perhaps, or drug
decriminalization—that mean less government involvement. Each is elected in
a decisive fashion, and each claims a mandate to advance his agenda. The
remaining question is what steps each must take to achieve his goals.
The answer is clear, and it is surprising. To implement his preferred policies,
the first president faces the full gauntlet of checks and balances—from the
formal requirements of bicameralism and presentment to the modern congres-
sional vetogates. And yet the president aiming to govern by inaction faces
virtually none. Instead, to get the federal government out of a particular issue,
the second president needs only to ensure that existing laws are not imple-
mented. Critically, he can achieve this goal without the help of Congress or the
courts; he can simply direct his executive agencies accordingly.
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. James Madison famously articulated a func-
tional account of our governmental structure that would use overlapping au-
thority to prevent any single branch from unilaterally making policy. No
doubt Madison and the other Federalists had in mind runaway action; after
all, the principal concern in Madison’s day was a Congress run amok. But the
core principle at play admits of no such restriction. In the modern administra-
tive state, the president’s refusal to enforce duly enacted statutes—what we
call “presidential inaction”—will often dictate national policy but will receive
virtually none of Madison’s checks and balances. This asymmetry between
action and inaction cannot be justified if we are to remain faithful to the
notion that interbranch competition is the core virtue of our constitutional
regime.
Yet the stakes are even greater than a need to update our theory of the separa-
tion of powers. Unchecked inaction fuels an imbalanced political structure that
endows the modern executive with more power to change the scope of govern-
ment than the Framers—or even the architects of the New Deal—ever
imagined. This imbalance amounts to a thumb on the scale, allowing presi-
dents to abandon unilaterally the governmental functions to which they are
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opposed. In other words, it creates a structural bias against government inter-
vention. The separation of powers is, of course, intended to create friction, to
make it difficult to pass legislation. We consider this a feature of our system,
not a bug. But once legislation is enacted, the president is obligated to enforce
it. Put simply, if the president does not want to enforce a law, he must advo-
cate for its repeal. He may not simply ignore it.
The relative institutional capacities of the various players make the solution
clear: our approach would call on Congress to assume the role of robust adver-
sary to the president, a role it can serve far better than the courts. Moreover,
examining interbranch relations with inaction in mind would offer new in-
sights on old problems, from statutory interpretation to federalism.
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Introduction
Imagine two presidents. The first campaigned on an issue that would
require him to expand the role of the federal government—maybe it was
civil rights legislation or stricter sentencing for federal criminals. In contrast,
the second president pushed policies—financial deregulation, perhaps, or
drug decriminalization—that would mean less government involvement.
Each is elected in a decisive fashion, and each claims a mandate to advance
his agenda. The remaining question is what steps each must take to achieve
his goals.
The answer is clear, and it is surprising. To implement his preferred
policies, the first president faces the full gauntlet of checks and balances—
from the formal requirements of bicameralism and presentment to the
modern congressional vetogates—because his agenda requires him either to
push for new laws or to extend the reach of existing administrative agencies.
In either case, he will need congressional authorization and funding, not to
mention the judiciary’s acquiescence. Conversely, to get the federal govern-
ment out of a particular issue, the second president faces virtually no checks;
he needs only to ensure that existing laws are not implemented. Critically, he
can achieve this goal without the help of Congress or the courts; he can
simply direct his executive agencies accordingly. The hurdles that the two
presidents will face are thus drastically different. Whereas the first president
cannot act alone, the second is free to engage in what amounts to unilateral
policymaking through inaction, free from the usual constitutional and politi-
cal constraints.
This state of affairs may sound far-fetched, but it is very real: in just the
past two years, numerous policy proposals and real-life decisions have drawn
on the president’s power to make policy through inaction. During the 2008
presidential campaign and early in his first term, for example, President
Obama suggested that he would not prosecute individuals purchasing and
selling medicinal marijuana in states that had legalized it. By 2011, he had
mostly reversed his position,1 but when the people of Washington and Colo-
rado legalized all marijuana use in 2012 (based in part on concerns about
federalism and prosecutorial discretion),2 activists began to call on the presi-
dent to decline to enforce federal marijuana laws in those states despite the
clear dictates of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).3
Inaction similarly became a matter of contention during the 2012 cam-
paign. In August, presidential candidate Mitt Romney declared that his first
executive act would be to waive all state obligations under the Affordable
1. See Tim Dickinson, Obama’s War on Pot, Rolling Stone, Mar. 1, 2012, at 32, availa-
ble at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-20120216 (detailing in
full the scope of the Obama Administration’s reversal and discussing present raids on medici-
nal marijuana dispensaries).
2. Paul Elias, President’s Pot Comments Prompt Call for Policy, Associated Press (Dec.
15, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/presidents-pot-comments-prompt-call-
policy.
3. Id.
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Care Act (“ACA”). That is, despite clear statutory language requiring that
the state governments take certain measures—for example, either joining
the federal insurance exchange or setting up their own insurance ex-
changes—as president, Romney would not have enforced that statute against
the states.4
Perhaps the most prominent example of unilateral policymaking
through inaction, however, arose in May 2012, when President Obama di-
rected his Department of Homeland Security not to bring immigration en-
forcement proceedings against certain undocumented immigrants.5 The
decision, dubbed Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), effec-
tively implemented portions of the Development, Relief, and Education for
Alien Minors (“DREAM”) Act, a legislative proposal that would grant am-
nesty to some immigrants. Although the Obama Administration had pushed
Congress to enact the law, the Senate never gave it an up-or-down vote.
Almost a year after it had become clear that the DREAM Act would not
succeed, the administration moved unilaterally to achieve the law’s aims.6
Since no recent president has resisted the allure of inaction, we need not
look far to find prominent examples.
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. James Madison famously articulated a
functional account of our governmental structure that would use overlap-
ping authority to prevent any single branch from unilaterally making policy.
Indeed, the essence of Madisonian government is that to function smoothly,
the federal government’s “several constituent parts [must], by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.”7 No
doubt Madison and the other Federalists had in mind unilateral policymak-
ing by action rather than inaction; after all, the principal concern in
Madison’s day was a Congress run amok. But the core principle at issue—
the idea that no branch should be allowed to dictate policy for the whole
nation—admits of no such restriction.
Indeed, modern presidents can usurp authority by both action and in-
action. The sheer size of the modern federal government, along with the
reach of the president’s administrative agencies, presents the twenty-first-
century president with unprecedented power to implement his agenda by
directing his agents to act and, critically, not to act. When President Bush
directs his Environmental Protection Agency to pursue his own goals at the
expense of enforcing congressional mandates,8 for example, or when any
president makes policy by choosing not to enforce duly enacted statutes, he
4. Mitt Romney, Republican Presidential Candidates Debate in Ames, Iowa (Aug. 11,
2011), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90711 (“And if I’m
president of the United States, on my first day, I’ll direct the secretary of HHS to grant a
waiver from Obamacare to all 50 states.”).
5. Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama To Permit Young Migrants To Remain
in U.S., N.Y. Times, June 16, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/
us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html.
6. Id.
7. The Federalist No. 51, at 288 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
8. See discussion infra Sections II.A–.B.
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encroaches on Congress’s authority to make law. The rise of the modern
administrative state has thus placed the spotlight on a new problem for the
Madisonian separation of powers—the problem of presidential inaction—
and the challenge is clear: there is no theoretical difference between the role
of presidential action and inaction in the constitutional scheme. Any com-
plete constitutional theory must deal with both forms of presidential
policymaking.
The prevailing conception of the relationship between the branches fails
to account for this reality. Scholars and theorists from our country’s found-
ing to the present have focused almost entirely on the problem of presiden-
tial aggrandizement through action. They wring their hands when the
president acts beyond the presumed limits of federal statutes,9 when the
commander-in-chief pursues warlike activities without congressional ap-
proval,10 and when the administrative state grows beyond the bounds of leg-
islative oversight.11 And yet they seem to worry far less—and in some cases
not at all—when the president fails to enforce statutes, when he prosecutes a
war less zealously than Congress wanted, or when he does not regulate in a
particular area.
Not everyone has overlooked this fact. To his credit, in his concurrence
in Heckler v. Chaney, Justice Marshall recognized the similarities between
presidential action and inaction as a matter of the separation of powers.
Although the Court stopped short of allowing judicial review of a presi-
dent’s decision not to enforce a law,12 Marshall emphasized the functional
similarities between “negative” and “affirmative” orders,13 noting that “one
of the very purposes fueling the birth of administrative agencies was the
reality that governmental refusal to act could have just as devastating an
effect upon life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as coercive governmen-
tal action.”14 Following Marshall’s example, modern administrative law
scholars have recognized that presidents can make policy through inaction.
They have failed, however, to appreciate the constitutional implications of
this insight.15
This is not to say that presidential overreach is not worth studying. In-
deed, a president’s decision to enforce a federal law beyond what Congress
intended raises serious separation-of-powers questions. But it is not self-
evident that we should worry more when a president takes affirmative steps
9. Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 123 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029
(2004).
11. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public
Choice to Improve Public Law (1997).
12. 470 U.S. 821, 825–27 (1985).
13. Id. at 851 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Rochester Tel. Corp. v.
United States, 307 U.S. 125, 143 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id.
15. See discussion infra Section II.B.
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that go beyond congressional authorization than when he chooses not to
enforce duly enacted statutes. At least at first glance, the president seems to
violate the will of Congress—and to dictate policy unilaterally—whether he
enforces a federal law more or less vigorously than Congress intended. The
Clinton Administration’s over-enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(“VRA”),16 for example, seems no more problematic than the second Bush
Administration’s under-enforcement of the same statute.17
Because presidential inaction is undertheorized, the interventions that
have poked at the periphery of the problem have remained underdeveloped.
For example, in the hours after President Obama announced the DACA pol-
icy, news websites were awash with arguments that the president was acting
beyond his “prosecutorial discretion.”18 In the months following the deci-
sion, a group of immigration officials even sued to make the president en-
force existing immigration laws.19 And yet no one presented a cogent
argument for why his conduct was constitutionally problematic. Recently,
Professor Price and Professors Delahunty and Yoo have begun to go down
this road, arguing that the president violates his duty under the Take Care
Clause when he uses prosecutorial discretion to decline to enforce statutes
with which he disagrees.20 That line of inquiry is worth pursuing, but this
Article makes the case that the formal historical-textual argument cannot be
all there is; without a broader functional theory, one cannot account for the
16. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (accusing the Department of Justice of
pursuing a “black-maximization” strategy).
17. See discussion infra Section II.B. In a sense, the similarities and differences between
action and inaction are a well-trodden subject. We encounter them in criminal law and philos-
ophy in the distinction between killing someone and letting him die. See generally Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Turning the Trolley, 36 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 359 (2008); Richard Trammell, Saving Life
and Taking Life, 72 J. Phil. 131 (1975). They arise in the constitutional-design distinction
between positive and negative rights. See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 864 (1986). They even crop up in American constitutional law, in
the state action doctrine and the DeShaney line of cases. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); see also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966
Term—Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L.
Rev. 69 (1967); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503 (1985).
Scholars and judges seem to understand the general difficulty of policing ubiquitous inaction,
the complexity of identifying workable baselines, and the inevitability of resource constraints.
But the separation-of-powers literature so far has all but completely failed to recognize the
unique constitutional valence of executive policymaking through inaction.
18. See, e.g., Ariane de Vogue, Legal Challenges to Immigration Announcement, ABC
News (June 15, 2012, 5:39 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/06/legal-chal-
lenges-to-immigration-announcement.
19. See Complaint at 1–3, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23,
2012).
20. Zachary Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vand. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 2014); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 Tex. L.
Rev. 781 (2013). But see Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the
Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 255, 284–89 (2013) (arguing that the “Take
Care” reasoning is unpersuasive, at least in the immigration context).
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nuances distinguishing permissible discretion from unconstitutional inac-
tion. A formalist, for example, might deem President Obama’s June 2013
decision to delay the implementation of the ACA’s employer mandate to be
a form of unconstitutional executive inaction;21 we think it makes little sense
to suggest that the president’s decision violated the separation of powers, in
part because the decision was functionally intended to strengthen legislation
Congress duly enacted.22
This Article aims to provide the vocabulary to make these important
distinctions by describing the problem of presidential inaction in a func-
tional manner (how does inaction affect a president’s ability to usurp the
role of Congress?) rather than by wooden textual analysis (what does the
Take Care Clause have to say about the subject?). It seeks to recover and
extend Marshall’s insight, to re-envision the law and theory of separation of
powers by placing presidential action and inaction on the same plane, as
theoretically similar modes of presidential decisionmaking that both require
traditional checks and balances. Indeed, when the president intentionally
abandons his duty to enforce the laws passed by Congress, he is unilaterally
making policy for the whole nation,23 contrary to Madison’s vision that na-
tional policy would be the product of interbranch cooperation and competi-
tion. If our system is to encourage such a collaborative governing process,
Madison’s theory of the separation of powers—at its heart a functional
framework—must be updated to account for presidential inaction.
Once it is acknowledged that presidential inaction demands some form
of checks and balances, the Constitution’s failure to provide this counter-
weight becomes striking. Existing doctrine and institutional design draw a
sharp distinction between action and inaction: judges are loath to review
executive refusals to act, and Congress is often impotent (and, in some cases,
unwilling) to step in to defend its preferred policies from executive inertia.24
Constitutional law and politics thus have no way to take into account what
has become a fundamental aspect of modern American government. Indeed,
today’s checks and balances may be better characterized as merely “action to
counteract action.” In one sense, then, this Article is part of a larger project:
21. See Michael W. McConnell, Obama Suspends the Law, Wall St. J., July 9, 2013, at
A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323823004578591503
509555268.
22. We discuss the constitutional implications of this timely example in Section II.C.
23. There are, of course, nuances to this argument. We discuss them in depth in Part II.
24. Two obvious counterexamples come to mind: the controversy surrounding the Con-
gressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and the Supreme Court’s decision
in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). We think these are rare exceptions that prove the
rule. Unlike most cases of inaction, President Nixon’s decision to impound funds was very
public, and so Congress had no trouble identifying the issue and mustering support to rein
him in. Similarly, President Bush’s decision regarding regulation of automobile emissions fell
short of the Clean Air Act’s clear baseline level of required regulation. These two factors—
publicity and clarity of delegation—play an important role in our theory of inaction, and we
discuss them more fully in Parts II and III.
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the attempt to link constitutional theory to the realities of modern
administration.
Our functional approach, moreover, offers new perspectives on a variety
of problems. Whereas the scholars who have noted presidential inaction—
most notably Price, Yoo, and Delahunty—have merely pointed out that such
nonenforcement may be unconstitutional, we do not stop there. Instead, we
go on to use the structural principle underlying our theory to propose new,
more sensible approaches.
Indeed, the stakes are even greater than a need to update our theory of
the separation of powers. Unchecked inaction fuels an imbalanced political
structure that endows the modern executive with more power to change the
scope of government than the Framers—or even the architects of the New
Deal—ever imagined. A president pursuing action faces the full gauntlet of
Madisonian checks and balances, from the formal requirements of bicamer-
alism and presentment to the modern, functional congressional vetogates;25
the president governing by inaction faces virtually none. This places a
thumb on the scale, allowing presidents to abandon unilaterally the govern-
mental functions to which they are opposed. In other words, it creates a
structural bias against government intervention. The separation of powers
is, of course, intended to create friction, to make it difficult to pass legisla-
tion. We consider this a feature of our system, not a bug. But once legislation
is enacted—once both houses of Congress pass a law and the president signs
it—the president is obligated to enforce that law. Put simply, if the president
does not want to enforce a law, he must advocate for its repeal. He may not
simply ignore it. Yet in the current scheme such inaction remains un-
checked, leaving us with a broken system of government in which duly en-
acted laws are not faithfully executed.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I makes the case that by
Madison’s functional account, presidential inaction should be understood as
a separation-of-powers problem. Of course, not every instance of inaction is
constitutionally problematic. Part II thus identifies the type of inaction that
raises separation-of-powers concerns. In essence, constitutional concerns
arise when the president unilaterally establishes policy for the nation. Part
III then reveals that despite the fact that the separation-of-powers scheme
should theoretically keep inaction in check, the current system does not pro-
vide for this balance in practice. The tools that Congress and the courts use
to police presidential action are powerless to confront the failures to act that
we deal with here.
Finally, Part IV turns to the implications of our observations for consti-
tutional law and doctrine. To be sure, unchecked inaction calls into question
the way we think about Congress’s role. But more insidiously, it threatens
25. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, J.L. Econ. & Org.
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Eskridge, Vetogates and American Public Law]; William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1441, 1444–48 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Eskridge, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption]; McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legisla-
tive Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 Geo. L.J. 705 (1992).
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the constitutional equipoise the Framers envisioned. It does so by allowing
the second president we met at the outset—the one who wants the federal
government out of a particular issue—to pursue his own policy goals in a
way that the first president may not; this asymmetry results in a bias toward
smaller government that our conventional concept of checks and balances
does not tolerate and cannot counter. Part IV also explores some ways insti-
tutional designers might overcome this theoretical failure, most notably by
granting Congress greater power—and greater incentives—to police execu-
tive inaction. A complete understanding of the constitutional dimensions of
presidential inaction allows us to better engage with the question of whether
such inaction is, in fact, impermissible and, if so, what Congress and the
courts might do about it.
I. Constitutionalizing Inaction
Madison famously articulated a functional account of our constitutional
structure, explaining that the Framers envisioned a government based on
overlapping authority to prevent any single branch from governing unilater-
ally. Because Madison’s theory is a functional one, it should be able to ac-
count for a single branch’s self-aggrandizing decisions regardless of how this
aggrandizement is achieved. In particular, the system of checks and balances
that the Framers envisioned should prevent the president from making pol-
icy unilaterally, whether through action or inaction.
Madison’s account and those of the modern separation-of-powers
scholars, however, focus only on the problem of policymaking through ac-
tion. Administrative law scholars, by contrast, have recognized that presi-
dents can make policy through inaction, but they have not considered the
constitutional consequences of this fact. In this Part, we argue that in order
to be consistent with Madison’s theory of separation of powers, our system
of checks and balances must take into account executive refusals to act. In
short, we constitutionalize the problem of presidential inaction.
A. Madison’s Theory: A Functional System of Checks and Balances
The Framers’ theory of checks and balances is a functional one designed
to prevent one branch of government from unilaterally dictating national
policy.26 By giving “those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the
26. To be sure, the Framers were evidently more worried about an overreaching Con-
gress than an executive run amok. See The Federalist, supra note 7, No. 48 (James Madison).
But that focus was premised on the political realities of the time, not on any reasoned belief
that the executive branch was the right place to vest discretion. To the extent that there is any
“original understanding” of the separation of powers, it is that “if either one grows too strong
we might be in trouble.” Greene, supra note 9, at 125. The Framers’ support for a strong
executive depended on the limited powers they gave to the president, as well as on the need for
an executive strong enough to counteract an overreaching legislature. In the post–New Deal
world, however, these factual assumptions have been undermined. Id. Thus, the president
must also be the focus of the modern “aggrandizement” inquiry.
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others,” the Framers sought to create a system in which competition among
the branches would limit overreach by any one of them—in which
“[a]mbition [would] be made to counteract ambition.”27 Madison thus gave
form to Montesquieu’s great insight28 by empowering each branch to keep
the power of the others in check; for example, Congress would check the
president to protect its own role as lawmaker (e.g., by withholding funding
for unauthorized acts29), just as the president could veto congressional ac-
tions that encroach on his role as chief executive.30
Of course, writing in 1787, Madison understandably used language fo-
cused on government action. Having just fought a war to throw off the
shackles of a tyrannical monarch, the Founders considered their greatest
threat a government that encroached on individual liberties.31 But Madison’s
theory was, at its heart, a functional one. Indeed, “the great problem” the
Framers sought to solve was designing institutions of governance that would
provide “practical security” against the excessive concentration of political
power in one branch of government.32 For Madison, constitutional provi-
sions clearly delineating limited domains of authority for each branch were
of limited utility, for “a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitu-
tional limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard against those
encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of
government in the same hands.”33 Thus, by Madison’s conception of the
branches’ respective roles, the ability of a president to dictate national policy
unilaterally is precisely what the separation of powers was meant to
prevent.34
27. The Federalist, supra note 7, No. 51, at 289–90 (James Madison). In other words,
“[i]f one branch fell under the control of a would-be monarch or tyrannical cabal, the other
branches might provide a check by using their constitutional powers to block oppressive mea-
sures.” Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L.
Rev. 2311, 2319 (2006).
28. “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body . . .
there can be no liberty . . . .” The Federalist, supra note 7, No. 47, at 271 (James Madison)
(quoting Montesquieu) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
30. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
31. See The Federalist, supra note 7, No. 51, at 291–92 (James Madison).
32. Id. No. 48, at 276 (James Madison); see also Levinson & Pildes, supra note 27, at
2316.
33. The Federalist, supra note 7, No. 48, at 281 (James Madison).
34. As Professor Strauss puts it, the overarching aim of the separation of powers is “to
protect the citizens from the emergence of tyrannical government by establishing multiple
heads of authority in government, which are then pitted one against another in a continuous
struggle.” Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 578 (1984). For a clear statement of the modern,
functional account of the separation of powers, see generally Rebecca L. Brown, Separated
Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1527–31 (1991); Harold J. Krent, Separat-
ing the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1253 (1988); and Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
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Because Madison’s theory is functional, it should apply whenever a
president makes a decision—whether realized through action or inaction—
that has the effect of dictating policy without the blessing of Congress and
the courts. In most cases, inaction is likely to serve the same policymaking
goals—and to pose the same constitutional questions—as action. Indeed, in
the abstract, inaction and action are two sides of the same coin: any refusal
to act may quickly be recast as a decision to do something.35 A president’s
choice to stop enforcing the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)36 is indis-
tinguishable in the abstract from a president’s choice to enforce a law al-
lowing same-sex couples the benefits of marriage.37 Inaction, in short, is no
different from action in any fundamental, constitutional sense.38
Still, inaction may initially appear less troubling than action because
inaction is mostly responsive. That is, a president can use it only to thwart
Congress’s affirmative plans. By contrast, when the president claims new
areas of authority for himself by taking advantage of broad delegation or by
employing novel constitutional theories, he has the freedom to set policy on
any issue and is not confined to areas where Congress has already legislated.
Contemporary political realities make it clear, however, that inaction
provides just as much opportunity for entrepreneurial executive policymak-
ing as action does. With the rise of the modern administrative state, the
opportunities for a president to engage in widespread policymaking through
inaction have grown exponentially. The last five decades have witnessed an
enormous expansion in federal legislation across a variety of domains, and
today the federal government is intimately involved in the day-to-day regula-
tion of environmental issues, civil rights, criminal law, and even so-called
moral issues.39 At the same time, since the New Deal, Congress has granted
the president and his agencies virtually plenary power to enforce federal
laws, and the courts have been loath to disturb this balance of power by
35. Cf. Frances Howard-Snyder, Doing vs. Allowing Harm, Stanford Encyclopedia
Philosophy (May 14, 2002) (updated Dec. 20, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2011/entries/doing-allowing.
36. Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
(2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
37. There are certainly counterarguments—for example, the argument that action in-
fringes on individual liberty in a way the Framers worried about, while inaction does not. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653,
662–65 (1985). But none of these objections negates the fundamental point that constitutional
theory should not make such a sharp distinction between the two.
38. This is not to say that inaction is no different from action as a practical matter. For
example, as the Court noted in Chaney, inaction is difficult to detect, and it is not obvious
what should trigger review of the executive’s refusal to act. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
831–33 (1985). We discuss the prudential aspects of presidential inaction in the remainder of
this Article.
39. See, e.g., Randall G. Holcombe, From Liberty to Democracy: The Transfor-
mation of American Government 210–49 (2002).
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applying the nondelegation doctrine.40 Against this backdrop, modern presi-
dents enjoy unprecedented opportunities to use inaction to make policy in
every realm—by failing to appoint agency heads, refusing to enforce certain
laws, or instructing their agencies not to regulate despite a congressional
mandate. In so doing, presidents claim the very power of unilateral poli-
cymaking that Madison sought to combat. Moreover, assuming, as the
Framers did, that presidents are driven by a “lust for self-aggrandizement,”41
one would expect them to seek to impose their will on the system in any way
possible.
Because inaction can be just as effective a policy tool as action, no func-
tional rationale can explain why Congress and the courts are willing and
able to step in when the president engages in unilateral policymaking
through action but not when he does so through inaction. If runaway presi-
dential action requires checks and balances, then, some form of interbranch
competition must exist to combat inaction that similarly results in executive
encroachment. In this regard, one need only look to some of the Supreme
Court’s most famous separation-of-powers decisions for affirmation that as
a general matter, any branch’s self-aggrandizement is unconstitutional. Con-
sider Clinton v. City of New York, in which the Supreme Court struck down
the Line Item Veto Act42 because “[t]here is no provision in the Constitution
that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.”43 This
power is left to Congress under Article 1, Section 7, and executive repeal
usurps that authority. Or take the legislative veto case, INS v. Chadha, in
which the Supreme Court found that the House of Representatives’ one-
house legislative veto of an executive immigration decision was unconstitu-
tional because it bypassed the requirements of bicameralism and present-
ment.44 Such action encroached on the president’s power to veto legislative
enactments; by skirting the Constitution’s requirements, Congress had vio-
lated the separation of powers.
As these cases demonstrate, the Constitution clearly prohibits one
branch from usurping the authority of another.45 Accordingly, when it
comes to self-aggrandizing executive inaction, the underlying purpose of
checks and balances should apply equally to all presidential policymaking,
40. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721 (2002).
41. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 59
(1967).
42. Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
43. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (emphasis added).
44. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
45. Of course, Clinton and Chadha are notoriously formalistic decisions. That is, they
stand most clearly for the simple proposition that executive or legislative action that violates
the formal requirements of the Constitution is necessarily invalid. But the fact that the cases
are usually read formally—and indeed that they were meant to be read that way—does not
undermine their value as we begin to think about the same relationships from a functional
perspective.
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notwithstanding formal distinctions between action and inaction. Put an-
other way, Madison’s account of legislative–executive separation of powers
works properly only if the branches have the tools to police the boundaries
of all of their coordinate branches’ decisions, no matter their form. It is thus
impossible to embrace Madison’s account of legislative–executive separation
of powers without accounting for inaction.
Yet neither the judiciary nor the academy has embraced this conclusion.
Indeed, as the next Section reveals, constitutional lawyers have thoroughly
considered the consequences of a president who employs power beyond his
authority, but they have not considered the implications of a president im-
plementing policies by consciously choosing not to exercise his executive
power at all. And while administrative law scholars have, in the narrow con-
text of their own field, recognized that the executive often decides against
enforcing laws, their work overlooks the constitutional dimensions of such
inaction.
B. The Missing Theory of Inaction
Although a considerable amount of constitutional-law jurisprudence
and scholarship has been devoted to separation-of-powers questions, both
judges and academics are curiously silent when it comes to the constitu-
tional implications of a president’s decision not to enforce a law. Consider,
for example, the seminal formulation of modern separation-of-powers doc-
trine: Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in the Youngstown case. Jackson
recognized that although the Constitution divided authority among the
branches, it made this authority overlapping, thus creating interdependence
and competition that would protect against tyranny by any single branch.46
This account underlies his famous tripartite theory of presidential power,
and yet that theory focused entirely on the problem of presidential action.47
To wit, Jackson suggested that the reach of executive power depends on
whether the president “acts” with Congress’s authorization.48 What Youngs-
town did not address, though, is whether it is constitutional for a president
to choose not to act pursuant to congressional authorization.
Constitutional legal scholarship similarly fails to take up this issue, fo-
cusing solely on issues associated with presidential action. Most pointedly,
Professor Sunstein argues that constitutional “dangers [are] thought to lie
principally in governmental action rather than failure to act.”49 While other
scholars are not as direct, it is clear that they share Sunstein’s primary con-
cern with executive action. For example, Professor Ackerman suggests that
46. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contem-
plates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”).
47. See id. at 635–38.
48. Id.
49. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 433
(1987).
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we overhaul several of the essential features of our system of government to
prevent “a vicious cycle” in which “Presidents break legislative impasses by
‘solving’ pressing problems with unilateral decrees that often go well beyond
their formal constitutional authority.”50 Ackerman is plainly concerned with
executive action, and he never suggests any concern over a president “solv-
ing pressing problems” by failing to act.
Professor Greene’s analysis of the constitutional dimensions of the rise
of the administrative state is similarly focused on runaway action.51 Greene
notes that agencies are progressively able to reach beyond their congressional
authorization because Congress is generally unable to override a presidential
veto of any legislation sanctioning agencies.52 But his discussion of executive
overreach presumes that the problem occurs only when a president acts be-
yond Congress’s intent. Indeed, the mechanism he describes does not func-
tion when the executive refuses to regulate; when the president’s choice is
inaction, there can be no entrenching veto because Congress has not passed
any new law.53 In essence, by focusing on the issue of bureaucratic growth,
which is an inherently action-oriented problem, Greene’s work largely ig-
nores the problem of inaction.
Strauss’s theory of the separation of powers also focuses on the problem
of presidential action. Strauss accepts as uncontroversial that Congress’s
power of the purse and veto-override prerogative are sufficient to protect
against executive aggrandizement.54 But these tools are largely impotent in
the face of presidential inaction, which requires no funding and does not
involve a veto. Thus, Strauss fails to consider the potential impropriety of
presidential inaction as a constitutional matter.
If constitutional lawyers have overlooked the problem of presidential in-
action, it should then be no surprise that virtually every solution to execu-
tive aggrandizement proposed in the literature similarly disregards inaction.
Indeed, Ackerman—writing mainly about executive war powers—proposes
that congressional legislation delegating power to the president be subject to
default sunset provisions and supermajority requirements for reauthoriza-
tion.55 Yet these solutions would be entirely ineffective as a response to the
problem of presidential inaction. Ackerman’s proposal would not be respon-
sive, for example, if the president failed to execute a war Congress had au-
thorized by statute. In other words, if Congress wanted to remain in
Afghanistan through 2013 but President Obama withdrew all combat troops
50. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 647 (2000).
51. See Greene, supra note 9, at 125–26.
52. Id.; cf. Mashaw, supra note 11, at 193 (explaining the rise of administrative poli-
cymaking as following, in part, from the president’s power to veto congressional attempts to
correct agency overreach); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
Harv. L. Rev. 1231 (1994) (focusing on the constitutional reasons for administrative
expansion).
53. That is, Congress cannot respond by legislating to counter the president’s decision.
See infra Section II.C.
54. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 578.
55. Ackerman, supra note 10, at 1047.
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sooner than that, a sunset provision on the Iraq War authorization would be
of no use.56 Greene’s solution to the entrenchment concern outlined above is
similarly unresponsive to inaction. He proposes that we allow concurrent
resolutions to block executive regulations57—effectively a legislative veto.
This solution, however, focuses exclusively on the promulgation of new reg-
ulations; a concurrent resolution to “block” executive inaction would face
very different obstacles. Greene’s tool would thus prove entirely ineffectual
with regard to presidential inaction.58
In sum, constitutional law scholars’ focus on action is evident in the
problems they identify and in the solutions they propose. Because these
scholars have missed the constitutional valence of presidential inaction, we
are left with a theory of the separation of powers that cannot account for the
constitutional concerns inaction raises.
Administrative law scholars, by contrast, have readily recognized that
unilateral policymaking can happen through inaction. But these scholars
view the problem entirely through the lens of the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”),59 which prohibits executive inaction in certain circumstances.60
As a result, although administrative law scholars acknowledge that inaction
can be impermissible as a statutory matter, they ignore the core constitu-
tional concerns.
Indeed, beginning in the 1980s, while the Reagan Administration pur-
sued its political preference for deregulation through various administrative
decisions, scholars began to highlight that the executive branch could engage
in policymaking through administrative inaction.61 In particular, adminis-
trative law scholars realized that President Reagan had reined in the power of
the federal government not only by repealing some existing regulations but
also by simply failing to enforce others, and these scholars alleged that such
deregulation and inaction were both prohibited by the APA.62 At first, courts
were receptive to these concerns. In the State Farm case, the Supreme Court
even went as far as to prevent the Reagan Administration from deregulating
56. To be sure, the president’s inherent power over foreign relations poses different ques-
tions, but the assumption that a president’s decision to pursue a war and his decision not to
do so are different as a matter of constitutional law is a vestige of the impoverished distinction
between action and inaction that we discuss here.
57. Greene, supra note 9, at 126.
58. The inability of Congress to check presidential inaction is a point we discuss in
greater detail in Section III.B.
59. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501–59, 701–06 (2012).
60. See id. § 706(1).
61. See, e.g., Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 505,
508 (1985) (“Deregulation, originally effected through legislative amendment, increasingly be-
came the product of administrative inaction, delay, and repeal. President Reagan’s Executive
Order 12,291 . . . greatly accelerated the shift to administrative deregulation.” (footnotes
omitted)).
62. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 177, 212 (“[S]ubversion may result from deregulation and inaction as much as from
regulation itself.”).
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the auto industry on the grounds that such deregulation violated the APA.63
When faced with the question of the Reagan Administration’s failure to en-
force existing regulations, however, the Court held in Heckler v. Chaney that
such agency inaction is presumptively unreviewable under the APA.64
Scholars immediately objected to the breadth of this claim, recognizing
that agency action, deregulation, and inaction are functionally identical.
Since Chaney, administrative law scholars have called for one primary solu-
tion: judicial review of agency inaction under the APA.65 Sunstein, for in-
stance, proclaims that “[t]he concerns that support the APA’s presumption
of reviewability appear no less applicable to review of inaction than to re-
view of action.”66 Then–Professor Merrick Garland similarly suggests—al-
beit a bit more cautiously—that inaction should be treated the same as
deregulation, but he also recognizes that inaction raises unique prudential
concerns.67 Yet in more than three decades of unchecked presidential poli-
cymaking through inaction,68 no administrative law scholar has recognized,
or least none has ever articulated, the constitutional dimensions of the prob-
lem. Instead, these scholars have attempted to read and interpret the APA in
a way that would justify an administrative solution to the problem.69 But in
so doing, they have missed the larger issue: the problem of presidential inac-
tion may be statutory, but it is also deeply constitutional.
That judges and scholars have failed to recognize the separation-of-pow-
ers concerns raised by the possibility of an executive engaging in unilateral
policymaking through inaction suggests a fundamental oversight in the pre-
vailing theories about the role of the president in our constitutional struc-
ture. We do not allege that the constitutional lawyers mentioned so far
would deny that inaction is possible or that administrative law scholars
would contend that it is not a constitutional problem. Our point is simply
that although inaction is possible and potent, the legal community has
63. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–42
(1983).
64. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
65. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 37, at 660–75; see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch
Monte, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 157 (1996); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency
Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1657 (2004); Mary M. Cheh, When
Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction,
and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 253 (2003).
66. Sunstein, supra note 37, at 656.
67. Garland, supra note 61, at 579; see also id. at 516 (describing the prudential rea-
sons—“the inadequacy of the agency record and the problem of allocating agency re-
sources”—why courts find deregulation easier to review than inaction).
68. See Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 795, 807, 810 (2010).
69. See Bhagwat, supra note 65, at 182–83 (arguing for judicial review of agency inaction
under a more deferential standard of review than action); Bressman, supra note 65, at 1696–97
(calling for judicial review of even arbitrariness claims, but under the structure of the political
question doctrine); Cheh, supra note 65, at 265, 286 (recognizing “[t]he [m]odern [f]ace of
[e]xecutive [i]naction” as a “[p]olitical [t]actic” and suggesting that courts must “police
nonenforcement”).
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largely missed its constitutional dimensions.70 As a result, current theories
fail to provide a complete account of the ways in which the modern execu-
tive can evade the Constitution’s checks and balances. Moreover, these theo-
ries lack a coherent plan for addressing the problem’s consequences.
In this Article, we begin to remedy that deficiency. In a world in which
presidential administration is the policymaking norm71 and yet Madisonian
checks are valued, presidential inaction can, at least in principle, violate the
most basic structural features of our constitutional order. The following Part
extends that insight, proposing a means to identify the kind of presidential
inaction that should cause constitutional concern.
II. Identifying Impermissible Presidential Inaction
Not every instance of presidential inaction violates the structural dic-
tates of the Constitution. After all, Congress tends to grant the executive
wide authority to choose how—and often whether—to enforce a statute.
Other factors may also play a role; for example, the Constitution gives the
president virtually unmitigated power over wide swathes of federal policy,
including the expansive realms of foreign affairs and criminal prosecutions.
Recognizing, in light of the president’s broad enforcement discretion, that
not every instance of executive inaction necessarily violates the separation-
of-powers principles the Framers outlined, in this Part we identify the char-
acteristics that distinguish permissible discretion from impermissible abdi-
cation of duty and thus the factors that determine whether a particular
presidential decision needs to be checked.
Although we do not think it necessary to define the bounds of imper-
missible inaction precisely—this is a political question better left to Con-
gress to sort out for itself (possibly with the help of the courts)—a definition
in broad strokes will be useful to the reader going forward. Because we offer
only a general definition, we do not purport to be able to identify impermis-
sible inaction with perfect accuracy in every case. Instead, this Part merely
highlights the factors that will allow decisionmakers to identify the executive
decisions that risk undermining the constitutional order. We use these fac-
tors to illustrate the important role inaction plays in American
policymaking.
70. This may be changing. Delahunty and Yoo, supra note 20, and Price, supra note 20,
have begun to look at inaction as a possible violation of the Take Care Clause, although, as we
contend above, their formal argument seems inadequate to deal with the realities of constitu-
tional practice. In a slightly different context, Benjamin Ewing and Professor Kysar recently
argued that the courts should respond to legislative inaction. See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas
A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 Yale L.J. 350
(2011). We share a common premise with Ewing and Kysar: the need for a constitutional
theory that accounts for the problem of inaction. Indeed, for those persuaded by Ewing and
Kysar on the problem of legislative inaction, executive inaction seems to be an easier case.
71. Greene, supra note 9, at 123–24.
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At its most basic level, the executive inaction we focus on is a president’s
determination on policy grounds72 that a specific law should no longer be
enforced. We consider policy-motivated inaction problematic because it re-
flects a likelihood that the president’s decision constitutes unilateral poli-
cymaking of the kind that informed Madison’s separation-of-powers theory.
Three main questions guide the inquiry into whether a president’s deci-
sion constitutes policy-motivated inaction. First, has the president’s level of
enforcement failed to meet some statutory baseline—language in a duly en-
acted law that requires the president to act? If such a baseline exists, the
inaction in question is presumptively (although not definitively) invalid. If,
instead, the statute vests the executive with wide discretion to choose how or
whether to enforce the law, it would be wrong to call a failure to enforce
problematic. In other words, the determination that an instance of presiden-
tial inaction contravenes a statutory baseline is necessary for the decision to
warrant constitutional concern. It is not sufficient, however, to trigger re-
view on its own. Second, does the president have a constitutionally justified
rationale for failing to enforce a law? If such a justification exists, the consti-
tutional issues inaction raises can essentially be trumped by constitutionally
enshrined discretion, even where enforcement falls below a statutory base-
line. Third, is there evidence to suggest that inaction is the result of the
president’s own policy preferences? Just as a court looks to extrinsic factors
to divine the intent of the actors in a suit alleging unconstitutional discrimi-
nation or a crime, evidence of a president’s a priori preferences can demon-
strate the true motivations behind presidential inaction.
A. Identifying the Statutory Baseline
The statutory baseline is important for a basic reason: it represents the
text we as a polity have agreed to obey. Indeed, Article 1, Section 7 of the
Constitution establishes a rule of recognition73 defining what it means for a
particular requirement to be “law.” Once a statute has gone through the
proper constitutional process—that is, once it has passed both houses of
Congress (“bicameralism”) and the president has signed it (“present-
ment”)—it is recognized as the law of the land. Absent competing constitu-
tional rights and responsibilities,74 it must be enforced by its terms.
Accordingly, constitutional concerns arise when the president fails to meet
the baseline for enforcement as established by the relevant duly enacted
statute.75
72. “Policy” is a bit of a blunt term for our specific purposes. We simply mean to express
the idea of the president’s policy platform. That is, if the president had complete say over
which laws should exist, would he support a specific law? If not, the objection sounds in
“policy” and is the source of our concern.
73. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 100 (3d ed. 2012).
74. See discussion infra Section II.B.
75. It will become clear in the following pages that the baseline does not always emanate
clearly from a statute. The baseline for enforcing the Voting Rights Act, for example, is found
in the attorney general’s construction of the law. In such cases, it is still the underlying statute
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Of course, the reality of modern lawmaking is that Congress vests broad
enforcement discretion in the executive,76 and thus in many instances a pres-
ident’s inaction will fall entirely and explicitly within Congress’s authoriza-
tion.77 What is important here, though, is that Congress tends to give
discretion to the president in defined terms; statutory grants of power allow
for a range of enforcement, which entail minimum requirements (the execu-
tive “shall” do something) and maximum authority (the executive “shall
not” do more), as well as options in between (the president “may” do what
he wants, within the defined range).78 Thus, when the president chooses to
enforce a law below the maximum authority, or when he declines to exercise
some authority Congress permitted him, this is inaction, but it is expressly
allowed. Only when the president falls below the minimum requirement and
fails to do what Congress has required must one begin to question whether
such inaction is constitutional.
The events leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts
v. EPA79 provide the clearest—and perhaps the most prominent—example
of a president disregarding a clear statutory baseline in the past twenty years.
In 1999, in response to growing concern over climate change, a group of
environmental advocates asked the EPA, which is required by the Clean Air
that provides the baseline; Congress implicitly incorporated the regulations into the baseline
when it reauthorized the Act. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). In the context of
DOMA, the baseline is inherent and, it might be argued, comes from the Constitution itself. In
all of these cases, the importance of the baseline depends on its constitutional provenance.
76. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke L.J. 819, 823 (“For both political and
institutional reasons, Congress has until recently relied almost entirely on the discretionary
model in delegating authority to regulatory agencies.” (footnote omitted)); see also Richard J.
Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 Tex. L. Rev.
1175, 1198 (1981); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 239, 239, 250–52 (1992).
77. Take, for example, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which grants the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) broad discretion to ensure public safety and prevent false
advertising. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 372, 378 (2012). Congress fully contemplated and duly au-
thorized the FDA to exercise discretion to enforce (or not to enforce) the Act. See id. §§ 371 to
379d-5. Note that Marshall concurred in the judgment in Heckler v. Chaney, in which the
Court rejected a legal challenge to the FDA’s decision not to enforce its normal licensing
protocols for lethal injection drugs. Marshall did so on precisely these grounds: he argued that
the FDA’s inaction was within the bounds of the original congressional mandate. 470 U.S. 821,
840–41 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
78. A well-known example is the statute at issue in Overton Park, which provided that
the secretary of transportation “shall not approve” construction through a public park unless
“no feasible and prudent” alternative was available. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411–13 (1971) (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964 & Supp. V)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
79. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Although Massachusetts v. EPA was a controversial, 5–4 deci-
sion, six Supreme Court justices recently reaffirmed their commitment to its holding in Ameri-
can Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). Since only eight justices
participated in the American Electric decision, moreover, it is likely that seven justices in fact
support the Massachusetts v. EPA holding.
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Act to regulate certain “air pollutants,”80 to classify vehicle emissions as
such.81 The EPA rejected the petition, stating in part that regulating carbon
dioxide was outside of its statutory authority.82 After the advocates sued to
force the EPA to regulate vehicle emissions, however, the Supreme Court
held that the language in the Clean Air Act “unambiguous[ly]” covers green-
house gas emissions from vehicles.83 The Court held, moreover, that because
carbon emissions did in fact meet the definition of “air pollutants” as set out
in the Clean Air Act,84 the plain language of the Act obligated the EPA to
regulate.85
In rejecting the EPA’s explanation for declining to regulate vehicle emis-
sions, the Court drew on the principle that enforcement must not fall below
a clear statutory baseline (if one exists). Indeed, the Court recognized that
Congress explicitly required that presidents regulate air pollutants that meet
certain requirements; the statute left it to the executive to decide how—but,
crucially, not whether—to do so. As the Court put it, “the President[’s] . . .
authority does not extend to the refusal to execute domestic laws” that re-
quire specific action.86 The EPA’s decision not to regulate thus provides a
clear example of executive inaction that is presumptively invalid.
Unsurprisingly, the Clean Air Act is not the only statute to set a baseline
by which one can determine whether a president’s decision not to enforce a
law constitutes impermissible executive inaction. Take, for example, the
CSA, which bans the possession, cultivation, and distribution of specified
substances, including marijuana,87 and does not distinguish between per-
sonal, professional, and medical use; all such uses are presumptively illegal.
Contrary to this federal provision, in 2012 the people of Washington and
Colorado legalized all marijuana use, and many advocates called on the
Obama Administration to consider refusing to enforce federal drug laws in
these states.88 But such inaction would violate the CSA: in 2005, in Gonzalez
80. The Clean Air Act requires the federal government, via the EPA, to regulate “air
pollutant[s] . . . which . . . cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a)(1) (2006).
81. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 510.
82. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922,
52,925–29 (Sept. 8, 2003).
83. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528–29 (describing the Act’s definition as
“sweeping”).
84. Id. at 529.
85. See id. at 528–29.
86. Id. at 534. While the Court’s intervention in Massachusetts v. EPA might indicate that
the problem of executive inaction can be adequately policed under the status quo, it is the
exception that proves the rule. Judicial checks on executive inaction are quite weak, see infra
Section III.A, and this case is famous as an outlier. What is more, the Supreme Court did not
actually force the EPA to regulate; it remanded for further review. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. at 534–35.
87. Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, §§ 401, 404, 84 Stat. 1242, 1260–62, 1264–65 (1970)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 (2012)).
88. See Elias, supra note 2.
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v. Raich, the Supreme Court articulated a clear statutory baseline requiring
enforcement of the Act’s provisions even for noncommercial interstate use.89
The Court reasoned that Congress intended the CSA to be a “comprehensive
regime” for drug regulation,90 that is, one that disallowed any categorical
exception.91 Thus, after Raich, the statutory baseline was clear: the president
must enforce the CSA in all circumstances.92
The Clean Air Act and the Controlled Substances Act both illustrate that
a statutory baseline can help determine when executive inaction is presump-
tively impermissible. By the same token, though, statutory baselines can be
used to identify inaction that falls wholly within the president’s discretion,
as granted by Congress. Consider, for example, President Obama’s recent
decision not to bring enforcement proceedings against certain undocu-
mented immigrants,93 which some have argued is unconstitutional.94 To be
sure, the decision effectively implemented portions of a failed legislative pro-
posal—the DREAM Act95—thus making President Obama’s decision an ap-
parent case of unilateral policymaking through inaction. Unlike the statutes
described above, however, the relevant immigration laws grant the attorney
general discretion at virtually every stage in the immigration process—in-
cluding removal proceedings—starting with explicit discretion not to initiate
such proceedings in the first place and extending to the power to grant relief
to immigrants found to be removable.96
89. 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005).
90. Raich, 545 U.S. at 12.
91. Id. at 13 (“To effectuate these goals, Congress devised a closed regulatory system
making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance
except in a manner authorized by the CSA.”). Note that by singling out the “closed regulatory
system” language, the Court made clear that no categorical exceptions are permissible while
implicitly permitting individualized exceptions as part of the executive’s prosecutorial
discretion.
92. Indeed, President Obama seems to recognize as much. Regarding marijuana, the
president said the following: “This is a tough problem, because Congress has not yet changed
the law . . . . I head up the executive branch; we’re supposed to be carrying out laws . . . . How
do you reconcile a federal law that still says marijuana is a federal offense and state laws that
say that it’s legal?” Kevin Liptak, Obama: Enforcing Pot Laws in States That Have Legalized It
Not a Top Priority, CNN Political Ticker, (Dec. 14, 2012, 9:37 AM), http://political-
ticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/14/obama-enforcing-pot-laws-in-states-that-have-legalized-it-
not-a-top-priority/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Preston & Cushman, supra note 5.
94. E.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 20.
95. The DREAM Act would have granted amnesty to undocumented immigrants who
were brought to the United States as children and have never committed a felony. For the most
recent form of the Act, see DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011).
96. See Gilbert, supra note 20, at 256 (“DACA fell squarely within Executive enforcement
powers under an expansive interpretation of congressional and Executive authority that has
deep roots in [among other things] . . . the broad delegation of powers by Congress to the
Executive under the Immigration & Nationality Act.”); David A. Martin, Essay, A Defense of
Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Cru-
sade, 122 Yale L.J. Online 167 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/12/20/martin.html.
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Indeed, in Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized this
expansive grant of discretion to the executive with regard to immigration,
holding that “[a] principal feature of the removal system is the broad discre-
tion exercised by immigration officials.”97 While this case did not present the
issue of categorical under-enforcement of immigration laws, Arizona did ar-
gue that Congress intended a greater level of enforcement than the adminis-
tration had pursued. The Court rejected that argument, though, explaining
that Congress expressly granted broad discretion to the executive.98 By the
Court’s reasoning in Arizona, Congress did not establish a baseline for en-
forcement in the immigration statutes, let alone one clear enough to invali-
date the deferred action policy. Thus, unlike the under-enforcement of the
Clean Air Act and the Controlled Substances Act, President Obama’s deci-
sion not to enforce certain immigration laws does not appear to violate a
statutory baseline and thus probably does not constitute impermissible pres-
idential inaction.
As the examples above show, a statutory baseline is critical to identifying
impermissible inaction; with this anchor, one may begin by comparing the
president’s chosen level of enforcement to the relevant statutory require-
ment. If enforcement fails to meet the baseline, then the president has
thwarted the will of Congress and, as a result, has engaged in presumptively
impermissible inaction. To be sure, in some instances the president’s failure
to enforce a law may not be policy motivated; other factors may necessi-
tate—or at least excuse—under-enforcement. To more precisely identify
when executive inaction raises separation-of-powers concerns in those cir-
cumstances, we turn to our second factor: whether a president chooses to
under-enforce a law for reasons unrelated to his specific policy goals.
B. Legitimate Reasons for Inaction
When a president chooses to enforce a law below the statutory baseline,
the presumption is that he has engaged in impermissible unilateral poli-
cymaking. But this presumption is rebuttable: there are many reasonable
excuses for a failure to act.99 For example, resource constraints might require
97. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
98. See id. at 2502–07.
99. Although we refer to “reasonable” excuses and “good” reasons for inaction through-
out the rest of this Article, these adjectives are not intended to imply that some policies—
whether pursued through action or inaction—are “good” or “bad” in a political or policy
sense but rather in a constitutional sense. It should go without saying that a policy that is
unconstitutional can still be a “good” policy and that there are any number of “bad” but
constitutional ideas. See, e.g., Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, New York, Oct.
14, 2013, at 22, 24, available at http://www.nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/
(“A lot of stuff that’s stupid is not unconstitutional. I gave a talk once where I said they ought
to pass out to all federal judges a stamp, and the stamp says—Whack! [Pounds his fist.]—
STUPID BUT CONSTITUTIONAL. . . . [Laughs.] And then somebody sent me one.” (empha-
sis in original)).
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that the president under-enforce some laws, even below statutory base-
lines.100 This observation is accurate as a historical matter.101 Indeed, some
argue that resource allocation is inherent in the president’s constitutional
role as the federal government’s chief executive and in the concept of
prosecutorial discretion.102 As the executive, the president is supposed to
make the hard resource-balancing decisions that cannot be entrusted to a
538-person political body that will rarely be able to reach consensus on
micro decisions, not to mention a group that will invariably want the best
for its members’ individual constituencies.103 Moreover, it would be illogical
to hold the president responsible where Congress has failed to provide suffi-
cient resources to fund all of its legislative priorities. These constitutional
and pragmatic principles may trump even legitimate concerns about
inaction.
A similar conflict may arise where enforcing a congressional mandate
interferes with one of the president’s Article II powers.104 When such con-
flicts are in play, a president may pursue a policy of inaction without trigger-
ing separation-of-powers concerns. A good example is the foreign affairs
power: if Congress mandated that the president engage in treaty negotiations
with another country or required that he send troops to a particular theater
of war, the president could argue in good faith that refusing to do so was a
means to defend the powers duly granted to him by the Constitution.105
Where there is such tension between competing constitutional principles,
resolution tends to be left to the political process.106 In short, when a presi-
dent can point to appropriate reasons for under-enforcing a law, one cannot
100. See Frank H. Easterbrook, On Not Enforcing the Law, Regulation, Jan.–Feb. 1983, at
14, 15.
101. Cf. L. Harold Levinson, Balancing Acts: Bowsher v. Synar, Gramm–Rudman–Hollings,
and Beyond, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 527, 547 (1987) (describing President Nixon’s attempt to cut
specific programs in order to spend within his budget).
102. Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 215, 253
n.192 (2005) (reviewing Harold J. Krent, Presidential Powers (2005)) (“In other words,
the President is to carry out his duties the best he can given the constraints of time, resources,
and funding. When he does this, he fulfills his constitutional obligations.”).
103. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 642.
104. Cf. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (granting certiorari
and asking the parties to brief the question of whether the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
“impermissibly infringes the President’s power to recognize foreign sovereigns” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). Note that the president must distinguish the Take Care Clause, which
requires the executive to enforce congressional statutes, from other Article II powers, which
reflect the independent powers of the president. See U.S. Const. art. II.
105. Cf. Gilbert, supra note 20, at 263 (arguing that even if DACA runs contrary to Con-
gress’s will, it may be justified “under an interpretation of Congressional and Executive au-
thority over immigration that has deep roots in the plenary power doctrine”).
106. Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J. 597, 597 (1976)
(“That there are political questions—issues to be resolved and decisions to be made by the
political branches of government and not by the courts—is axiomatic in a system of constitu-
tional government built on the separation of powers.”).
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say that he has necessarily engaged in unilateral policymaking through
inaction.
At the same time, the absence of any such reasons for inaction can sup-
port the presumption that a president’s failure to carry out the law consti-
tutes impermissible unilateral policymaking.107 Take, for example, the Bush
Administration’s under-enforcement of Section 5 of the VRA.108 Section 5
forbids certain “covered” jurisdictions from implementing a change in “any
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or proce-
dure with respect to voting” without first (1) obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment from the District Court for the District of Columbia establishing that
the proposed change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” or (2)
submitting the change to the attorney general and receiving no objection
within sixty days.109 While this text may not reveal a clear baseline enforce-
ment requirement, regulations state that
the Attorney General shall make the same determination that would be
made by the court in an action for a declaratory judgment under section 5:
whether the submitted change neither has the purpose nor will have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or
membership in a language minority group.110
Therefore, just as a federal court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that
any submitted change complies with the statutory requirements protecting
minority voting power, the same obligation is imposed on the attorney gen-
eral. The congressional baseline in this context is thus a requirement that the
attorney general object when submissions have the purpose or effect of de-
nying or abridging the right to vote on account of race.
During the second Bush Administration, however, the Civil Rights Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice consciously chose not to meet this require-
ment. Evidence of that decision abounds. One need only look to the
107. Of course, we recognize that proponents of executive power might argue for the
opposite presumption. We believe, however, that our suggested presumption is more typical of
legal analysis. Indeed, a timely and excellent example of an argument that a particular nonen-
forcement decision could not plausibly be justified on resource-allocation grounds and thus
constituted a policy-motivated action can be found in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Arizona v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2520–21 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In any event, this objection amounts to an argument over burden shifting, and it does
not undermine the thrust of our argument.
108. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (2006)). In the time since the first draft of this Article was posted, the Supreme
Court struck down Section 4 of the VRA as unconstitutional, thus depriving Section 5 of its
operative effect. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). This does not affect the
discussion here, as we consider the historical enforcement of the provision, not its prospective
application.
109. Voting Rights Act § 5, 79 Stat. at 439.
110. 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2013) (emphasis added).
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systematic, quantitative data to comprehend the scope of the administra-
tion’s inaction with respect to the VRA: throughout its two terms, the ad-
ministration severely understaffed the unit tasked with reviewing
preclearance submissions. Between 2001 and 2006, the number of
preclearance submissions had increased by over 70 percent,111 but the staff
had been cut to one-third of its previous level.112 During this period,
preclearance approval rates fell to their lowest in the history of the VRA, and
only one out of every 2,000 submissions received an objection during the
administration’s first five years in office, compared to one out of every five
hundred during the previous fifteen years.113 It is thus reasonably clear that
the administration chose not to enforce Section 5 relative to the apparent
baseline requirement.
Turning to whether this choice was policy motivated, the answer seems
clear: there is no evidence of any resource constraints that could justify the
decision to under-enforce federal civil rights laws.114 Indeed, between 2001
and 2005, the congressional appropriation for the Civil Rights Division in
particular grew from $92 million to $108 million.115 The number of full-
time employees in the Voting Rights Section, furthermore, grew from 104 to
109 between 2001 and 2004.116 Nor is there evidence that enforcing the Vot-
ing Rights Act conflicted with any of the president’s other constitutional
111. Changing Tides: Exploring the Current State of Civil Rights Enforcement Within the
Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 242 (2007) (responses to questions
posed to Wan Kim, Assistant Attorney General) (“While 7,080 submissions were received in
2006, only 4,121 submissions were received in 2001 . . . .”).
112. Id. at 115, 118 (statement of Joseph Rich, former Voting Section chief). Requests by
the career staff to increase the number of analysts for preclearance submissions were denied.
Id. at 118.
113. Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the
Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 Ohio St. L.J. 177, 192 & fig.3 (2005). The Na-
tional Commission on the Voting Rights Act, an ad hoc coalition of civil rights organizations,
focused on broader measures of Section 5 enforcement and independently concluded that
overall enforcement had significantly declined from 2001 to 2005. See Nat’l Comm’n on the
Voting Rights Act, Protecting Minority Voters: The Voting Rights Act at Work
1982–2005, at 75–77 (2006), available at http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/admin/voting_
rights/documents/files/0023.pdf.
114. Goodwin Liu, then a professor and now a justice on the California Supreme Court,
offered the theoretical defense that the Bush Administration was, in fact, reallocating resources
toward alternative enforcement priorities, including human trafficking and religious discrimi-
nation. Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned, 4 Duke J.
Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 77, 81 (2009). Given the scope of the politicization of the Civil Rights
Division, however, he too ultimately concludes that the Bush Administration appears to have
acted “on political whim.” Id. at 81–82. It should be noted that Justice Liu’s essay hints at the
deep checks-and-balances concerns that motivate this Article, but he limits the scope of his
analysis to the Civil Rights Division.
115. See U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Funding Federal Civil Rights Enforcement
(2005), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/crfund06/crfund06.pdf.
116. Id.
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prerogatives.117 The lack of evidence explaining President Bush’s decision to
under-enforce Section 5 thus suggests that the choice was motivated by pol-
icy concerns.
C. Extrinsic Evidence of Policy Goals
While the second factor focuses on evidence that presidential inaction is
not motivated by policy goals, the third factor looks for the converse: evi-
dence that a president chooses inaction precisely because of his policy priori-
ties. Specifically, the third factor identifies instances in which the outcome of
a president’s under-enforcement is consistent with his public policy state-
ments. Such a state of affairs could signal that he chose inaction in order to
promote his own policy goals at the expense of Congress’s,118 a decision that
would raise separation-of-powers questions. Of course, extrinsic evidence
cannot prove a causal connection between policy preference and inaction,
but it does provide support for an inference that the president’s inaction was
policy motivated.119 (For the statistically inclined, such evidence allows the
observer to update her priors on the issue.) Such inaction amounts to uni-
lateral policymaking and thus raises the separation-of-powers concerns out-
lined above.
Returning to the Voting Rights Act, extrinsic evidence of President
Bush’s political agenda further demonstrates that the White House’s deci-
sion to under-enforce Section 5 was motivated by policy concerns. Indeed,
the decision coincided with public statements suggesting that the adminis-
tration viewed religious-freedom claims as more worthy of the Justice De-
partment’s attention than voting-rights suits, not because resources were
limited or because the VRA raised constitutional concerns but as a policy
matter.120 It is thus even more evident that the administration’s decision to
117. Although the Supreme Court has raised constitutional concerns with respect to Sec-
tion 5, see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009), there is no evidence that the law’s constitutionality played a
role in the administration’s decision.
118. Whether the aims of the enacting Congress or the current Congress are more rele-
vant is a question that lies beyond the scope of this Article.
119. Our methodology draws on analogues in other areas of law. Most familiarly, in crim-
inal law, public statements about a criminal goal can be taken as evidence of criminal intent.
And in antitrust, courts infer collusion when parallel conduct is accompanied by certain other
facts and circumstances called “plus factors.” See, e.g., Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v.
Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1242–43 (3d Cir. 1993).
120. See Dahlia Lithwick, Guilt by Association: Senate Blocks Obama’s Pick to Head the
Civil Rights Division Because He’s Fought for Civil Rights, Slate (Mar. 5, 2014, 5:59 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/03/debo_adegbile_senate_
blocks_obama_s_pick_to_head_the_justice_department.html (“It is not a secret that the Civil
Rights Division in the Bush years reflected the deeply held conviction that voting rights and
anti-discrimination law were no longer American problems or priorities. Indeed the Bush
Justice Department’s priorities perfectly presaged the reality of today’s civil right debate: The
only real discrimination in America is directed toward religion . . . .”); cf. Charles C. Haynes,
Fighting Religious Discrimination: Bush Administration’s Quiet Campaign, First Amendment
Center (Mar. 4, 2007), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/fighting-religious-discrimina
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under-enforce Section 5 amounts to a unilateral decision to take the law off
the books.
Yet perhaps a clearer example of the probative value of extrinsic evi-
dence of policy goals is the EPA’s rationale for refusing to regulate carbon
dioxide as a greenhouse gas. Recall that in the run-up to Massachusetts v.
EPA, the EPA stated explicitly that it would not classify automotive emissions
as the kind of “air pollutant” that triggers the Clean Air Act’s require-
ments.121 Responding to advocates’ petitions asking it to define carbon diox-
ide as a regulable pollutant, the EPA argued that such regulation would be
bad policy.122 Specifically, the agency claimed that the regulation would con-
flict with the administration’s views on the science behind climate change,
interfere with its approach to domestic fuel-efficiency standards, and
threaten President Bush’s foreign policy negotiations on environmental mat-
ters.123 Given the administration’s explicit acknowledgment of the policy
motivations behind the EPA’s decision not to regulate, it is undeniable that
this was an instance of impermissible inaction. Of course, not every case will
present such clear-cut evidence that the president has chosen inaction in
order to pursue his policy agenda. Still, such extrinsic evidence can help to
make the case when the executive falls below the statutory baseline for
enforcement.
One additional virtue of considering extrinsic evidence of policy goals is
that such evidence may exculpate certain conduct that appears at first to be
constitutionally problematic. For example, in July 2013, unsettled by ques-
tions about cost and complexity,124 the Obama Administration announced
that it would delay enforcement of the ACA’s “employer mandate” until
2015.125 Recognizing that Obama had effectively changed the law unilater-
ally, legal scholars and political journalists immediately voiced concern, al-
leging that the president was not “taking care” to enforce the law.126 There is
something to this argument: the text of the ACA states relatively clearly that
the employer mandate was to become effective in 2014,127 so the president’s
tion-bush-administration%E2%80%99s-quiet-campaign (describing the Department of Jus-
tice’s increased enforcement of federal religious-rights legislation).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 80–82.
122. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922,
52,929–31 (Sept. 8, 2003). The heading of the section describing this ground for the EPA’s
decision is labeled “Different Policy Approach.” Id. at 52,929. Moreover, the ruling explicitly
states that the “EPA disagrees with the regulatory approach urged by petitioners” and instead
“agree[s] with the President.” Id.
123. Id. at 52,929–31.
124. See Valerie Jarrett, We’re Listening to Businesses About the Health Care Law, White
House Blog (July 2, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/07/02/we-re-
listening-businesses-about-health-care-law.
125. See id.
126. See McConnell, supra note 21; Ezra Klein & Evan Soltas, Wonkbook: Governing by
Waiver, Washington Post Wonkblog (Aug. 8, 2013, 8:10 AM), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/08/wonkbook-governing-by-waiver.
127. See Nicholas Bagley, Does the Administration Have the Legal Authority to Delay the
Employer Mandate? And What If It Doesn’t?, Incidental Economist (July 3, 2013, 12:42 PM),
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critics were correct to point out that his decision entailed a level of enforce-
ment that fell short of the statutory baseline. Yet President Obama’s decision
was meant to serve the goals of the enacting Congress, in this case the
smooth implementation of major recent legislation. So it seems odd to call
this impermissible inaction.
Indeed, the core of this Article’s constitutional argument is that the ex-
ecutive must not be allowed to thwart the will of Congress by refusing to
enforce the law. In this case, it is almost nonsensical to suggest that President
Obama’s hostility toward the ACA—his signature legislative achievement—
motivated him to use the power of nonenforcement to skirt the require-
ments of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. Instead, the decision to
delay the employer mandate was prompted by a belief that a reasonable de-
lay would enhance the effectiveness of the law.
D. DOMA: Impermissible Inaction in Action
Taking the three factors outlined above and applying them to a single
case, we can identify a very recent example of executive inaction that was
clearly driven by policy goals. In 2011, President Obama announced that his
administration would no longer defend Section 3 of DOMA against consti-
tutional challenges, although it continued to enforce the law.128 At first
glance, it might seem odd to describe a decision that involves continued
enforcement of a law as one where the president has chosen inaction. But we
focus on the president’s decision not to defend DOMA in the context of the
federal government’s duties regarding defensive litigation. Evaluated in this
context and against the appropriate baseline, the decision not to defend Sec-
tion 3 clearly constituted policy-motivated inaction.
Returning to the first factor, in the context of defensive litigation, there
is a long-standing baseline of enforcement pursuant to which the Depart-
ment of Justice “generally defends a law whenever professionally respectable
arguments can be made in support of its constitutionality,”129 out of respect
for congressional will.130 Moreover, if the Justice Department decides that it
will not defend a particular law, tradition dictates that the attorney general
must write a letter to the Speaker of the House informing him or her of the
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/does-the-administration-have-the-legal-author
ity-to-delay-the-employer-mandate-and-what-if-they-dont/.
128. See infra note 134 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court ultimately struck
down Section 3 of DOMA in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and we draw on
this decision where relevant.
129. Seth P. Waxman, Essay, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1073, 1078 (2001).
130. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable
Statutes, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7, 12 (2000) (“If Presidents were to disregard laws . . .
based solely on their own constitutional views, they would deprive Congress of the ability to
enact effective legislation premised on its considered constitutional views to the contrary—
even by a two-thirds majority over a constitutionally based veto.”). But see Neal Devins &
Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 507 (2012).
May 2014] Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers 1223
decision and the underlying rationale.131 Of course, if a law is clearly uncon-
stitutional, few would contend that the president is required to defend it.132
But if a constitutional argument can be made for the law, the president and
his attorney general have a duty to defend it.133
And yet, in February 2011, Attorney General Holder informed House
Speaker Boehner that on the president’s orders, the Justice Department
would not defend DOMA.134 In brief, the rationale was that President
Obama believed that sexual orientation qualified as a suspect classification
and thus triggered a heightened level of scrutiny under which DOMA would
certainly fail.135 Although there is much to be said in support of the adminis-
tration’s position, the argument unquestionably relies on a “contested the-
ory of the constitutionality of laws regulating gay rights.”136 Indeed, in
Windsor, the decision striking down Section 3 of DOMA, the Supreme
Court expressed this very concern: “The Executive’s failure to defend the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress based on a constitutional theory not
yet established in judicial decisions has created a procedural dilemma,” Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote.137 Although the Court categorized the problem as pro-
cedural because the question at issue related to Article III standing, the
Court’s discussion was imbued with constitutional implications. The Court
recognized the “difficulty the Executive faces” when it “makes a principled
determination that a statute is unconstitutional.”138 But the Court made it
clear that the “appropriate” course of action is for the executive to “mak[e]
the case to Congress for [its] amendment or repeal.”139 Otherwise, permit-
ting the executive to refuse to defend laws as “a common practice in ordi-
nary cases” would “pose[ ] grave challenges to the separation of powers”
since the executive would “at a particular moment . . . be able to nullify
131. 28 U.S.C. § 530D (2006).
132. See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitu-
tional Laws, 96 Geo. L.J. 1613 (2008).
133. The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable
Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55 (1980).
134. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A.
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
135. Id. Congress hired a private group, represented by Paul Clement, to defend DOMA,
but this defense was ultimately unsuccessful. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013).
136. Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, Volokh
Conspiracy (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/23/the-executive-power-
grab-in-the-decision-not-to-defend-doma; cf. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding, for the first time in a federal court, that laws classifying on the basis
of sexual orientation are subject to strict scrutiny), aff’d on partial grounds sub nom. Perry v.
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
137. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
138. Id. at 2689.
139. Id.
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Congress’ enactment solely on its own initiative.”140 It is particularly note-
worthy that the Supreme Court admonished the Obama Administration for
failing to defend Section 3 when, just a few pages later, it held that the
administration was ultimately correct in concluding that Section 3 is uncon-
stitutional. By failing to defend DOMA in the absence of binding precedent
rendering it unconstitutional, therefore, President Obama fell short of the
baseline requirement that the president defend a defensible act of Congress.
Turning to the second factor, there is no indication that President
Obama acted pursuant to considerations other than his own policy goals.
The attorney general’s letter to Boehner did not mention any practical ratio-
nale for the administration’s decision not to defend DOMA (e.g., lack of
resources or competing constitutional commitments).141 Nor were DOMA
cases such an overwhelming part of the Justice Department’s docket that one
could infer a resource-based motivation.142 Moreover, the department re-
mained a party to the primary DOMA challenges making their way through
the courts.143 The decision to intervene—and, often, to litigate the merits
while simply not defending the law—thus saved the administration virtually
no time or other resources.
To the contrary, considering the third factor, there is extensive evidence
of the policy motivations behind the president’s decision. Indeed, the deci-
sion appears to stem from candidate Obama’s 2008 open letter to the LGBT
community, in which he called for DOMA’s repeal.144 Moreover, soon after
the Obama Administration decided not to defend the law, the administra-
tion went on the record in support of repealing the Act145—this after ex-
tending employment benefits to same-sex partners of federal employees146
and successfully pushing for the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”147 The
140. Id. at 2688.
141. See Letter from Eric Holder to John Boehner, supra note 134.
142. The letter merely identifies two cases in which DOMA was challenged. Id. (citing
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 310
CV 1750 VLB (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2010), 2010 WL 4483820, and Complaint, Windsor v. United
States, No. 1:10CV08435 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010), 2010 WL 5647015).
143. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012), aff’g
Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), and Massachusetts v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010); Pedersen v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824
F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
144. Open Letter from Barack Obama to the LGBT Community (Feb. 28, 2008), available
at http://www.bilerico.com/2008/02/open_letter_from_barack_obama_to_the_lgb.php.
145. Helene Cooper, Obama to Support Repeal of Defense of Marriage Act, N.Y. Times
Caucus Blog (July 19, 2011, 6:23 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/
obama-to-support-repeal-of-defense-of-marriage-act.
146. Memorandum on Extension of Benefits to Same-Sex Domestic Partners of Federal
Employees, 2010 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 450 (June 2, 2010), available at http://www.gpo
.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201000450/pdf/DCPD-201000450.pdf.
147. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’, N.Y. Times (Dec. 22,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military.html.
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administration’s consistent attempts to advance LGBT rights through vari-
ous political means—executive order and legislative repeal—lend further
support to the view that politics and policy motivated President Obama not
to defend DOMA.
President Obama’s decisions regarding DOMA show that these three
factors can be useful in determining whether the president has engaged in
policy-motivated inaction. But even as we set forth these principles for iden-
tifying such presidential inaction, we recognize that the real world is never
so easily defined. No doubt the three factors do not definitively or exhaus-
tively identify all cases of impermissible inaction.148 After all, governing is a
complex affair: resource constraints are ubiquitous, presidents are in the
business of making decisions that serve their predetermined policy goals,
and priorities and obligations will often conflict. Perhaps the best one can
do is to observe that policy-motivated inaction exists on a spectrum. In
some instances, it will be absolutely evident that the president has fallen
short of a congressional baseline with no justifiable rationale. In others, even
taking into account all of the available evidence, it will not be so clear. But at
the very least, these factors can help us begin to identify cases in which a
president uses inaction as a means of unilateral policymaking, which would
then trigger separation-of-powers concerns.
As the examples in this Part have demonstrated, policy-motivated presi-
dential inaction is identifiable, common, and prominent. Multiple presi-
dents have pursued their policy goals by choosing not to enforce certain
laws, even when there is a baseline requirement that they do so. The struc-
ture of the Constitution should enable each branch of government to resist
such tyranny and encroachment from their coordinate branches.149 But as
the next Part suggests, Congress and the courts lack the tools to fight back
when the executive uses inaction as a tool for self-aggrandizement.
III. A Problem Without Any Checks
When the president wants to move beyond the legislative status quo, to
do more than Congress has allowed in the past, Madison’s scheme requires
that he both win the support of the full Congress and convince the judiciary
that his actions are legal. Moreover, he must avoid provoking the wrath of
Congress after he makes a decision; the legislature may respond to action it
148. We note that both the second and third factors are necessarily underinclusive. A
president may be able to point to reasons for falling short of his enforcement duties unrelated
to his policy goals, but in reality such reasons are merely a pretext for his true motivations.
Similarly, a president may engage in impermissible inaction without any accessible evidence
that it was policy motivated. These may or may not be instances of the inaction we find
problematic, but disentangling the two factors and determining the true motivation for a par-
ticular decision not to act would be difficult and would no doubt obscure the clear case against
policy-based inaction.
149. See supra Section I.A.
1226 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:1195
does not like with hearings, budget sanctions, or any number of other proce-
dural tools. But where the president pursues policy through inaction, Con-
gress and the courts are all but powerless to stop him.150
A. Weak Judicial Tools
In the vast majority of cases, doctrinal and prudential considerations
will prevent the courts from enforcing limits on inaction. With respect to
doctrine, the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of APA review to the
point that judicial review of agency inaction is virtually nonexistent. What is
more, even if the law permitted broader judicial review, prudential concerns
would likely prevent review: the particular institutional competency of the
courts makes it unlikely that judges could ever serve as a meaningful check
on a determined president’s inaction.
As an initial matter, judicial review of agency inaction is almost nonexis-
tent. It is true that the APA includes “failure to act” in its definition of
“agency action.”151 Accordingly, the courts’ power to review agency deci-
sions152 ostensibly includes the ability to review agency inaction. But current
doctrine significantly curtails the scope of agency action that courts can
plausibly review. First, under State Farm (the auto-deregulation case), the
only agency decisions subject to APA review are those that actually and sys-
tematically deregulate; informal choices and one-off decisions not to enforce
existing regulations fall outside the holding of the case.153 Second, even if an
instance of agency inaction satisfies that case’s requirements for review, it
will likely run up against Heckler v. Chaney. In Chaney, the Supreme Court
150. We restrict the inquiry to legislative and judicial checks on executive power. To be
sure, there are nonstructural checks on all executive decisions, the most obvious being the
electorate’s ability to vote out a do-nothing president. Four responses are readily appar-
ent. First, if the only protection against presidential inaction is electoral politics, then, in
Madisonian terms, there are no “checks” on presidential inaction. As Madison explains, “A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experi-
ence has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” The Federalist, supra note
7, No. 51, at 290 (James Madison). The notion of separation of powers is a supplement to
electoral politics. Second, the voters are going to have a hard time recognizing and policing
inaction because the problem isn’t always a do-nothing president. Presidents Bush and Obama
have done a lot, but they have also failed to enforce some laws. Third, of course, the voters
could have punished them for failing to enforce Section 5 of the VRA or refusing to defend
DOMA if they wanted to, but (1) one-issue voters are rare and (2) there are undoubtedly fewer
public instances of inaction that are unlikely to be subject to such a check. Fourth, even if the
voters do punish an inactive president, this does not remove the bias in favor of inaction that
we articulate below. See discussion infra Section IV.A. If one believes that at least some inac-
tion will go unaddressed in a subsequent, more active administration, then a president’s deci-
sion not to enforce a law will lead to less action in the long run than Congress intended when
it passed each law, even if the do-nothing president and his party lose the White House.
151. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012).
152. Id. § 706.
153. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42
(1983).
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found that enforcement decisions are subject to prosecutorial discretion154
and thus fall under the § 701(a)(2) exception to judicial review.155 Moreover,
the Court specifically held that most “failure[s] to act”—and certainly
agency refusals to take enforcement action—are therefore presumptively
unreviewable.156
Taking State Farm and Chaney together, the options for review of inac-
tion are quite narrow. Of course, some inaction is still reviewable—Massa-
chusetts v. EPA made this clear.157 Because the plaintiffs in that case were able
to convince the Court that regulation of “air pollutants” was not subject to
agency discretion under the Clean Air Act, they were effectively able to neu-
tralize Chaney’s presumption against reviewability.158 But while some may
view Massachusetts v. EPA as an indication that the courts can check execu-
tive inaction, that case is the exception that proves the rule. Massachusetts v.
EPA was extremely high profile—the agency’s overt policy statements and
the explosiveness of environmental regulation during the Bush years com-
bined to place the issue firmly in the limelight—and this publicity ultimately
prompted the Court to step in. In contrast, low-salience instances of execu-
tive inaction, of which there are surely many, will almost certainly go un-
checked. Indeed, only a truly blatant case of executive inaction could even
plausibly result in some judicial review, and even then, the review is likely to
be minimal. For example, the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA merely re-
manded the case to the lower court for further review159—that is, it did not
ultimately rule against the agency on the merits.
Surveying these and other doctrinal options for judicial review of
agency inaction, Professor Staszewski concludes that “courts rarely order
agencies to promulgate regulations or take enforcement action, and even
when they require agencies to fulfill mandatory statutory obligations (such
as meeting congressionally-imposed deadlines), courts are not ordinarily
empowered to dictate the form that such actions must take.”160 In short,
current doctrine simply does not allow for robust judicial review of execu-
tive inaction.
Beyond these doctrinal limits, there are three prudential reasons why
judicial review is a poor check on executive inaction, and these reasons are
linked to the three phases of a potential lawsuit: justiciability, merits review,
and remedy. First, it is difficult to define a “case” of inaction that is suitable
for review. Second, courts face a series of line-drawing questions that make
154. 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[For] [r]efusals to take enforcement steps . . . we think the
presumption is that judicial review is not available.”).
155. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (exempting agency action that was “committed to agency dis-
cretion by law” from judicial review).
156. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 828, 831–33.
157. See discussion supra Section II.A.
158. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. Some describe this type of case as
judicial review of “nonpromulgation.” Deacon, supra note 68, at 805.
159. 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007).
160. Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 Emory L.J. 369, 381–82 (2009).
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them particularly deferential to the executive on the merits. And third,
judges are likely wary of granting a remedy that amounts to telling the exec-
utive how and when to act. Accordingly, even if we assume that judicial
review of executive inaction is permissible, the courts prove a hollow hope.
1. Justiciability
When a president chooses not to enforce a law, it is often difficult to
identify a way for potential plaintiffs to challenge this decision; there is no
obvious “case or controversy”161 that could be brought before the courts. On
the one hand, it may be easy to plead that, for example, an agency has cho-
sen not to enforce a law. On the other hand, the agency can just as easily
respond that it has simply not enforced the law yet.162 Indeed, the agency
rulemaking process is notoriously prolonged, involving many levels of analy-
sis and technical review.163 Short of a statutory deadline or a clear statement
from the agency that it will never regulate—recall the EPA’s 2003 statement
along these lines164—Article III courts will lack jurisdiction to hear chal-
lenges to inaction. What is more, even putting constitutional concerns aside,
courts’ general desire for a clear “case” will significantly weaken judicial re-
view.165 Of course, the APA does allow for judicial review of action that is
“unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”166 But prevailing precedent
makes it exceedingly difficult to meet this burden of “unreasonable” delay,
which will likely keep many cases of inaction out of court.167
Judicial economy poses an additional hurdle for differentiating between
acceptable delay and impermissible inaction. Plaintiffs could characterize
any minute delay as executive inaction, so if the judiciary were to review
every potential case of inaction, the costs would be astronomical.168 In order
161. See U.S. Const., art. III, § 2.
162. See Bhagwat, supra note 65, at 182 (“In addition, it is often difficult to identify when
an agency has failed to act—at the least, delay and inaction can be difficult to distinguish—so
that there is often no clear focus for judicial review of agency inaction.”).
163. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
Duke L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992).
164. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
165. That said, it is unlikely that the related issue of standing would keep the plaintiffs out
of court. See Bressman, supra note 65, at 1670–75. Indeed, that the Supreme Court was willing
to review the EPA’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA suggests that other prudential concerns,
not a lack of standing, serve as a barrier to challenges to inaction.
166. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).
167. Although “delay” cases are reviewable despite the parallel with Chaney, see Ronald
M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 689, 770–73
(1990), in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, the Supreme Court held that these
provisions apply only to discrete, legally required administrative actions, 542 U.S. 55, 63 & n.1
(2004).
168. Cf. Bressman, supra note 65, at 1693 (discussing the costs this would impose on
agencies “both in terms of administrative flexibility and administrative efficiency”).
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to avoid an unmanageable caseload, courts are likely to devise some pruden-
tial limits to confine their docket to cases with either a credible plaintiff or
nonfrivolous claims on the merits.
2. Merits
Even if the courts were willing to reach the merits of a case, however,
they would likely defer on a series of questions that require drawing difficult
lines and ultimately refuse to force the executive to act. First, a court willing
to address the merits of a case would have to determine the statutory base-
line. In some cases, such as Massachusetts v. EPA, this question might be
amenable to analysis using the traditional tools of statutory interpretation.169
But this will not always be the case. Take, for example, the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,170 which requires the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (“SEC”) to regulate in part to protect against national crises.171 Is this
mandate a judicially enforceable statutory minimum? If so, what obligations
does it place on the SEC? If the Act were carried to its literal end, a court
would likely balk at defining duties that are incommensurate with the SEC’s
historical role and available budget.
Second, even if a court were willing to draw a baseline, how should it
respond when the president claims his decision was motivated by resource
concerns? Nonenforcement decisions “tend to involve a complex balancing
of many factors, including the likelihood of success in litigation and whether
agency resources are better spent elsewhere,” factors that courts are not well
suited to review.172 This is a real concern; as we have acknowledged, the
reality is that some executive inaction is properly justified on resource
grounds.173 And while we are willing to label an invocation of resource con-
straints as pretextual based on the information available, it is unclear
whether a court would do so. Not only would a court face significant infor-
mational constraints but—as is typical across the federal judiciary—it
would also likely defer to the executive.174 Indeed, in most cases, such defer-
ence might even be appropriate. But the effect here would be to deny some
plaintiffs proper relief.
169. See supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text; see also Train v. City of New York, 420
U.S. 35, 42–44 (1975) (determining the baseline spending rate required by the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act).
170. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (“National emergencies, which . . . burden interstate commerce
and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manip-
ulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by excessive specula-
tion on such exchanges and markets, and to meet such emergencies the Federal Government is
put to such great expense as to burden the national credit.”).
172. Bhagwat, supra note 65, at 182.
173. See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.
174. Cf., e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727–28 (2010) (de-
ferring to the executive’s assertion that material support of the humanitarian wings of terrorist
organizations would undermine federal antiterrorism efforts).
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3. Remedy
The final issue is one of remedy. From one perspective, this issue might
be framed as a question of the separation of powers—that is, whether it
might be a violation of the Constitution for the judicial branch to dictate
how the executive enforces the laws.175 But in our view, this would mis-
characterize the harm. The very premise for judicial review of executive in-
action is that the executive has failed to meet the requirements of the
Constitution, thereby making it entirely proper for the judiciary to inter-
vene.176 Nevertheless, it might still be worrisome for courts to dictate that
the executive act in a particular way, especially given the complicated re-
source and enforcement decisions they might have to interfere with.177 This
represents yet another reason why the courts will be deferential to the presi-
dent in evaluating inaction.
In sum, the courts will tend to under-enforce federal statutes in the face
of presidential inaction. Not only does current doctrine provide very limited
avenues for plaintiffs to challenge executive inaction, but courts are simply
not well suited to police this sort of problem for a variety of prudential
reasons. Thus, when the president threatens the separation of powers by
unilaterally creating national policy through inaction, no meaningful check
will come from the courts.178
B. Weak Congressional Tools
The previous discussion has emphasized the weaknesses of judicial
checks on inaction, but legislative checks on inaction are similarly ineffec-
tive. The constitutional structure and institutional realities of the federal sys-
tem provide Congress with numerous tools to check the kind of presidential
aggrandizement Madison worried about. Many of these tools, however, are
inapplicable when a president decides not to act, and others are merely less
effective in the face of unchecked inaction.
175. Cf. Doyle v. Brock, 821 F.2d 778, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
176. Cf. Garland, supra note 61, at 564–65 (“[W]hen a court merely orders an agency to
act, leaving the choice of action to the agency’s discretion, no trespass [of the separation of
powers] occurs.”).
177. Peter Lehner suggests some ways around this problem, Peter H.A. Lehner, Note, Judi-
cial Review of Administrative Inaction, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 627, 660–61 (1983), but the concern
remains.
178. It is worth mentioning that two other avenues for judicial checks on executive inac-
tion—implied statutory rights of action and § 1983 suits—have also been limited by the Su-
preme Court. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188–91 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) (summarizing the Court’s skepticism of implied rights of action); see also
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (applying the implied rights of action test to
beneficiary enforcement claims under § 1983). While these methods are beyond the scope of
this Article, the doctrine supports our basic conclusion that the judiciary is largely without
tools to police executive inaction.
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1. The Power To Legislate
Congress’s most potent check on the president is also its most basic: the
president’s authority to enforce laws extends only as far as Congress legis-
lates. While modern presidents have invariably claimed the initiative for pro-
posing legislation,179 no president may take lawful administrative action in
the domestic arena without official authorization by statute. Indeed, even
proposed laws that have the president’s support must pass through numer-
ous vetogates before they become law.180 One need only consider the trials
and tribulations involved in the passage of the ACA to appreciate the time,
effort, and luck necessary to pass modern legislation.181 Not only must each
house of Congress pass the statutory authorization but also the bill may die
at any number of stages, including in committee, in conference, or by fili-
buster on the Senate floor. Moreover, once Congress has approved a law that
would grant the president some authority, it must fund the initial delegation
and (often) approve the president’s nominee to head a new agency.182 The
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, for example, was unable to ex-
ercise its legal authority until Congress belatedly approved a director.183
In contrast, a president’s decision not to enforce a law does not run up
against Congress’s power to legislate. That is, if the president decides not to
enforce a law, this decision does not require the support of a committee
chairman, a vote on the floor of either house of Congress, or reconciliation
in committee.184 When President Bush’s EPA decided not to regulate certain
auto emissions, it did not need to seek Congress’s approval—it merely de-
clined to regulate. Similarly, if President Obama were to decide that federal
marijuana laws were not worth enforcing, he could direct the Department of
Justice to focus its efforts elsewhere while leaving the CSA on the books. Put
another way, the most powerful and robust checks on action—vetogates,
bicameralism, and congressional review—are entirely absent in the inaction
context.
179. See Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency 29 (2d ed. 1960); Richard E.
Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, 48 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
641 (1954).
180. See generally Eskridge, Vetogates and American Public Law, supra note 25; Eskridge,
Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, supra note 25, at 1444–48; McNollgast, supra note 25.
181. See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Health Care Reform and American
Politics (rev. & updated ed. 2012).
182. See generally Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the
Executive (4th ed. 1998) (discussing historical examples of congressional grants of power to
the executive).
183. See Edward Wyatt, Appointment Clears the Way for Consumer Agency to Act, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 2012, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/politics/cor
drays-appointment-clears-way-for-consumer-financial-agency.html.
184. Consider, for example, the cases of inaction described supra Part II.
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2. Oversight
Congress’s power to check presidential action does not stop after it has
granted the president authority to act. Indeed, Congress exerts influence
over the executive branch through formal oversight procedures, informal
monitoring, and, in rare cases, sanctions. Yet while these mechanisms might
prove useful for reining in overreaching presidential action, they remain in-
effective as a means for Congress to police executive inaction.
Formal congressional oversight of executive actions takes a number of
forms. For example, Congress has the power to order studies and reports of
agency action and to hold oversight hearings to evaluate agency behavior.185
Where the issues are salient to Congress and the public, such oversight hear-
ings can be quite successful.186 More informally, members of Congress can
monitor executive action by communicating directly with agency staff to
express their preferences,187 a practice known as “jawboning.” Further moni-
toring occurs through informal staff contacts and agency liaisons.188
If these formal and informal oversight processes reveal agency action
that Congress is unhappy with, Congress can influence executive action
through its power to sanction agencies—and thus to bring them in line with
its preferences. Congress’s sanction power “extends ultimately from [its]
fundamental power of legislation . . . and its corollary power to spend, or
refuse to spend, money.”189 Accordingly, Congress can use its power to legis-
late to curtail an agency’s authority, either by “amending or, in the extreme,
by repealing the agency’s enabling act or other important pieces of legisla-
tion that give an agency its power.”190 Similarly, and perhaps more realisti-
cally, Congress can punish agencies that stray too far from its preferred
185. Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 7, 12 (2000).
186. See Charles Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and Congres-
sional Procedure, 50 Admin. L. Rev. 199, 203–05 (1998).
187. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 130
(2006).
188. Croley, supra note 185, at 12.
189. Id. at 11. For discussions of Congress’s ability to use appropriations riders and ear-
marks, among other powers, to bring agencies in line, see Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential
Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443, 472–76 (1987), and Beer-
mann, supra note 187, at 84–91.
190. Croley, supra note 185, at 11; see also Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Admin-
istrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L.J. 451, 458 (1979) (discussing Congress’s use of its legislative
power to pass statutes requiring agencies to follow certain rulemaking procedures). As then-
Professor Kagan notes, the first regulatory agencies were conceived of as mere “transmission
belts” for congressional directives. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev.
2245, 2255 (2001). Due to the increasing complexity of regulation, however, it may be impos-
sible for Congress to achieve its regulatory goals by enacting detailed statutory prescriptions.
See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 727
(2009). Thus, even when Congress has sought to control regulatory policy by statute, it has
done so by mandating results rather than by specifying mechanisms to achieve goals. Mark
Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 Iowa
L. Rev. 1, 8 (1994).
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policies, “curtail[ing] executive action by limiting agency funding [or] per-
sonnel.”191 In theory, an agency that does not carry out Congress’s manifest
desires may see its budget, and thus its power, diminish or disappear alto-
gether. For example, in 1997, after the FDA promulgated new rules on to-
bacco, some members of Congress resisted appropriating money for the
FDA to enforce the new regulations.192 Similarly, officials in the Office of
Management and Budget (“OMB”) were “sufficiently impressed by a recent
threat to the appropriation for its Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs that it took steps to subject OMB-agency interactions to greater Con-
gressional and public scrutiny.”193 Congress’s power to punish the executive
by limiting an agency’s authority and budget thus provides it with several
positively Madisonian tools for preventing the president and his agencies
from acting in ways that are inconsistent with Congress’s will.
Many of these tools for influencing presidential action would seem to
apply just as well to inaction. Congressional committees, for example, could
hold oversight hearings to ensure that the president and his agencies are not
systematically under-enforcing the laws relative to the congressional base-
line. Similarly, members of Congress could jawbone to prompt an adminis-
tration to enforce a particular law. Sanctions could be an option for
particularly egregious instances of inaction.
None of these checks on inaction, however, ultimately proves to be a
practical or theoretical reality, for several reasons.194 It is difficult, first, for
Congress to monitor agency actions because it is not designed to collect and
analyze information effectively. While none of the formal oversight powers
is particularly difficult for Congress to draw upon as a procedural matter, in
practice Congress cannot provide the kinds of meaningful oversight de-
scribed above unless it knows what agencies are doing.195 Indeed, “scholars
[have] noted . . . the widespread lack of knowledge and interest among
191. Greene, supra note 9, at 171; see also Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821, 834 (2003) (“[A]gencies are
ever worried about their budgetary health as well as the scope of their regulatory jurisdiction,
and for those reasons must be overly solicitous of the preferences of members of Con-
gress, who after all control agency budgets and define the boundaries of agency authority.”).
192. Croley, supra note 185, at 72–74.
193. McGarity, supra note 189, at 475; cf. Croley, supra note 185, at 55–66 (providing a
good case study of the give-and-take among the White House, Congress, and the EPA on
rulemaking).
194. As a methodological matter, we cannot prove the weakness of congressional tools
with respect to inaction through empirical examples because such examples are exceedingly
rare. We can, however, infer as much. There is a cottage industry criticizing Congress’s tools
when used to monitor runaway executive power. When one investigates the underlying ratio-
nale of these criticisms, though, it is apparent that they would apply with even greater force
when it comes to executive inaction. Thus, to the extent that these tools are weak when applied
to action, it is even less likely that they will effectively check inaction.
195. Croley, supra note 185, at 12.
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members of Congress, evident in repeated surveys and actual cases, regard-
ing obviously important administrative decisions.”196
The second—and perhaps the most fundamental—limitation on Con-
gress’s power over the executive is the fact that it is a plural body. For exam-
ple, implementing formal oversight proceedings, repealing an agency’s
enabling act, or reducing an agency’s funding will “require the action of the
full Congress” or at least of a committee—and this action is “costly and
difficult to accomplish.”197 Making matters more difficult is the reality that
“a particular agency may be subject to oversight by several committees
which have competing goals.”198 For example, Congress’s ability to exercise
its budgetary power to curtail runaway executive action requires the Author-
izing and Appropriations Committees of both houses to discover and agree
on an effective budgetary sanction—a tall task for a polarized, intensely po-
litical body.199 Coordinating a full Congress to fight back against the execu-
tive may often be even further complicated by the need for support from
more than a simple majority: to impose its most effective sanctions, Con-
gress must gain the approval of two-thirds of both houses in order to over-
come an almost-certain presidential veto.200 As a case in point, during the
Clinton presidency, the Republican Congress repeatedly attempted to de-
crease the budget of agencies carrying out President Clinton’s policy agenda.
But Congress often found that the president was capable of forcing the re-
turn of funding to agencies by exercising his veto power.201 More broadly,
and perhaps more perniciously, Congress is often simply unable to generate
a coherent policy agenda, let alone coherent action to reprimand the presi-
dent.202 As an institutional and practical matter, Congress is simply not good
at oversight, whether by way of formal procedures, informal monitoring, or
sanctions.203
196. Kagan, supra note 190, at 2256. But see Croley, supra note 185, at 33 (discussing the
McNollgast argument that administrative procedure facilitates legislative control by reducing
the costs of congressional monitoring).
197. Kagan, supra note 190, at 2259.
198. Seidenfeld, supra note 190, at 11.
199. McGarity, supra note 189, at 475–76.
200. See Kagan, supra note 190, at 2259; see also Mashaw, supra note 11 (explaining how
this mechanism contributes to the rise of the administrative state).
201. Kagan, supra note 190, at 2259 n.38; see also David Baumann, The Art of the Deal, 31
Nat’l J. 2700, 2701 (1999), cited in Kagan, supra note 190, at 2259 n.38 (“The conventional
wisdom around town is that Clinton always wins these budgetary showdowns, and . . . has
extraordinary leverage during such . . . negotiations . . . .”); David E. Rosenbaum, Bush Rules!
It’s Good To Be the President., N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 2001, at WK16, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2001/01/28/weekinreview/the-nation-bush-rules-it-s-good-to-be-the-president
.html, cited in Kagan, supra note 190, at 2259 n.38 (“Clinton used a veto threat to block more
than 70 riders attached to budget bills that would have relaxed . . . [regulatory
requirements].”).
202. See Seidenfeld, supra note 190, at 10.
203. For an empirical argument that Congress rarely sanctions agencies, see Croley, supra
note 185, at 106 (“Once the complexities of the relationship between legislators and agencies
May 2014] Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers 1235
What is worse, each of the problems highlighted above is exacerbated
when the issue Congress must address is executive inaction. The reason for
this is quite simple. Decisions that are manifested as inaction are, by defini-
tion, both less public and less salient than decisions that are implemented
through action; most of the time, when a president decides not to enforce a
law, there is no new regulation, no new request for funding, and no public
statement. Significantly, Congress’s oversight tools—both formal and infor-
mal—require that it identify a decision it does not like and take positive
steps in response. Whatever trouble Congress has in identifying and reacting
to executive action, these structural shortcomings will apply with extra force
to inaction.204
To be sure, many of the cases of presidential inaction we have discussed
thus far were particularly public, probably more so than most executive ac-
tion, and so in these cases an information deficit probably did not affect
Congress’s response (although concerns about a lack of a trigger and mis-
aligned incentives remain). Congress was aware of President Bush’s decision
to under-enforce the Clean Air Act, just as it was cognizant of President
Obama’s decision not to defend DOMA. This apparent publicity, however,
is an artifact of the cases we have chosen: we made it a point to discuss the
most obvious examples of presidential inaction. But most other decisions
not to enforce the law will naturally be less salient, and so the information
deficit described here will be relevant, if not dispositive.
Consider the case of oversight hearings. The problems associated with
hearings as a tool to check executive inaction are largely prudential. Even if,
for example, Congress structured an agency to require hearings on all
agency decisions, including decisions not to act, two issues remain. First, just
as it is difficult to identify a “case” of inaction for judicial review short of the
president or his agency heads announcing a decision to halt enforcement of
a particular provision,205 it is not clear what event could trigger such hear-
ings when the issue is inaction.206 Second, just as court dockets are often
overloaded, Congress could not possibly choose to exercise its oversight
powers to revisit every instance of executive inaction; this is a basic question
of bandwidth.207
are taken into account . . . the picture changes. Legislative influence over agency-level regula-
tory decisions becomes more precarious.”). See also David B. Spence, Administrative Law and
Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 Yale J. on Reg.
407, 423 (1997) (arguing that structural decisions about the scope of agency authority are
infrequent).
204. Cf. supra notes 187–193 and accompanying text.
205. It is, of course, possible that this might happen, as in the case of Holder and DOMA.
See discussion supra Section II.D.
206. The impoundment dispute could be a useful guide. See infra note 212 and accompa-
nying text.
207. Congress’s questioning of Anne Gorsuch could be an example of a successful over-
sight hearing to counteract executive inaction. Gorsuch, the head of the EPA during the Rea-
gan administration, essentially engaged in wholesale environmental deregulation. She was then
attacked in oversight hearings and held in contempt, and she ultimately resigned over the
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Reduced or conditioned funding similarly fails as a check on executive
inaction. As a theoretical matter,208 we might understand this fact to follow
from the risky position Congress assumes when it threatens to withhold
funding on the basis of executive inaction. Budget fights are protracted zero-
sum battles,209 and every member of Congress must choose carefully how to
allocate his or her political capital. It is certainly possible that executive inac-
tion could justify a member taking up the cause. But, because inaction will
always be less salient than action and thus less likely to provoke the interest
of a member’s constituents, it is unlikely that any member would choose to
fight what would be a personal battle, especially when the battle would re-
quire compromising on other priorities. Finally, in the extreme case, condi-
tioned funding would be no check at all, for if a president believed in a
severely limited federal role and pursued inaction across the board, congres-
sional threats to withhold funding would be largely ineffective.210
C. Theory Versus Practice
All of this, once again, is not to say that Congress and the courts have no
formal tools to police presidential inaction. Most significantly, where Con-
gress is clear about its desired baseline level of enforcement, the president is
presumptively unable to venture below this baseline.211 If the baseline is un-
clear, the legislature can always pass new legislation requiring something
more specific of the president. If the current Congress wanted to force Presi-
dent Obama to pursue harsher enforcement of immigration laws, for exam-
ple, it could amend the relevant statutes to require a certain level of
enforcement with respect to better-defined classes of immigrants.
The Nixon-era dispute over presidential impoundment of funds pro-
vides a stark example of Congress’s using baselines to control the president.
In response to President Nixon’s decision not to spend some of the funds
allocated for specific purposes, Congress passed the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which expressly required the presi-
dent to spend funds that Congress had allocated for specific purposes.212 But
the impoundment controversy is perhaps most useful as evidence that such
congressional intervention is rare—Congress has only stepped in where the
controversy. See Patrick Warren, Servants and Reformers: The Roles of Appointees Under Separa-
tion of Powers 2 (Apr. 24, 2007), http://www.stanford.edu/group/peg/3_may_2007_papers/
servantsandreformers-PW.pdf. We believe that this is another exception that proves the rule,
however, as we were unable to find any other example of an oversight hearing successfully
addressing executive inaction.
208. It is difficult to prove the negative, but we know of no examples of Congress threat-
ening to withhold funding on the basis of executive inaction.
209. Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget
Process, 35 Harv. J. on Legis. 387, 387–88, 415 (1998) (describing the budget process’s “zero-
sum games”).
210. See discussion supra Section III.B.
211. For several examples of such a clear baseline, see discussion supra Section II.A.
212. Pub. L. No. 93-344, tit. X, 88 Stat. 297, 332; cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling In-
herent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework for Judicial Review, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 863,
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president’s decision not to act was particularly public and thus where it was
relatively easy for Congress to identify the issue and generate support for a
legislative response.
Indeed, this debate played out in the Windsor decision—which struck
down Section 3 of DOMA—in the pages of two separate and often conflict-
ing dissenting opinions. Justice Alito, while dissenting on the merits of the
decision, agreed that the requirements of Article III standing were met in the
case—specifically because, in his view, Congress had standing to defend a
law when the executive declined to do so.213 Justice Scalia, who wrote the
primary dissent and vehemently disagreed that there was standing in the
case, accused Alito of ignoring all of the formal checks that Congress may
use to counteract executive power: “If majorities in both Houses of Congress
care enough about the matter, they have available innumerable ways to com-
pel executive action without a lawsuit—from refusing to confirm Presiden-
tial appointees to the elimination of funding.”214 Scalia is, of course, correct
that Congress could play a role as the arbiter of inaction. But what he misses,
and what Alito presumably recognizes, is that as a practical matter, Congress
often does not do so, for reasons both legal and prudential.
Our suggestion—one that aligns nicely with Alito’s approach—is to
think about how the separation of powers works in practice. While virtually
no affirmative executive policy can be implemented without some basic ap-
proval from Congress and while Congress may revisit executive action at any
time, the legislature has fewer and weaker tools at its disposal to counteract
inaction, given its particular institutional features. Likewise, notwithstand-
ing the technical doctrinal availability of judicial review in some narrow in-
stances, the courts in most cases will not serve as an institutional sentry.
In sum, neither the congressional nor the judicial tools that comprise
the current system of separation of powers can prevent the president from
making policy unilaterally by refusing to act. As a result, presidential inac-
tion remains a largely unchecked facet of executive authority.
IV. The Implications of Inaction
In most cases, when the government takes allegedly unconstitutional ac-
tion, the natural next step is litigation. As we have explained, however, that
step will be mostly unhelpful when it comes to presidential inaction, given
that judicial review will be largely unavailable. So, what next? In this Part, we
ask what unreviewable, unchecked unilateral policymaking means for our
system of constitutional governance. Understanding that the courts are not
the answer, we then consider what tools do exist to counter unconstitutional
863 & n.3 (1983) (noting that although the Court did not reach the issue of the constitutional-
ity of impoundment in Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975), many lower courts “have
held that the President lacks inherent constitutional authority to impound funds”).
213. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2711–14 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 2701, 2704–05 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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inaction. This exploration will take us largely outside the judicial arena to
Congress and the states.
Recognizing this gaping hole in the separation-of-powers scheme leads
us to new insights on old problems. Most importantly, as we argue in Sec-
tion IV.A, unchecked presidential inaction reveals a structural imbalance in
the prevailing constitutional theory—a bias in favor of smaller government.
The action-oriented scholarship in both the constitutional and administra-
tive law fields would lead one to believe that we should be concerned not
about a bias toward smaller government but about a growing executive215 or
the “[r]ise and [r]ise” of the administrative state.216 By focusing almost ex-
clusively on action and ignoring inaction, however, these scholars have
missed a far more troubling power bestowed on the president: the power
effectively to take federal laws off the books, at least for the duration of his
term. This is not merely conjecture. As our examples have demonstrated, the
rise of the administrative state has made this type of unilateral policymaking
through executive inaction relatively common.
At the same time, the tools of the separation of powers—modified in
light of modern governance—might be able to account for the problem of
presidential inaction. In Section IV.B, we attempt to resuscitate Congress as
a robust adversary of the executive. While the legislature’s current tools are
clearly inadequate, congressional review could avoid the constitutional and
prudential concerns that plague judicial oversight. Once one recognizes that
presidential inaction presents the same separation-of-powers problems as
affirmative executive overreach, moreover, the implications for other areas of
public law become clear. Indeed, although our theory speaks most clearly to
reforms within Congress that would empower it to check presidential inac-
tion, a new focus on the functional similarities between action and inaction
points in other promising directions as well, leading to new insights on old
problems, from statutory interpretation to federalism.
A. Structural Bias
Because the current system of checks and balances is ineffective in ad-
dressing a president’s unilateral policymaking through inaction, over time
we will end up with a government in which fewer laws are enforced than the
Constitution requires. In other words, unchecked executive inaction creates
a bias towards under-enforcement of laws, despite the fact that those laws
were duly enacted pursuant to Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution.
The mechanism of this asymmetry is not complicated. Recall the two
presidents we met at the outset. The first needed to expand the role of the
federal government in order to achieve his goals. He was therefore unable to
pursue his preferred policies without gaining the support of the other
branches. In contrast, the second president could achieve his policy goals
much more easily; because he sought to implement policies that entailed
215. See Ackerman, supra note 10.
216. Lawson, supra note 52, at 1231.
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scaling back the level of government involvement, he could simply decide
unilaterally to halt the enforcement of existing laws. This is where the bias
begins: deciding not to enforce a law is easy. And once the decision not to
enforce is made, Congress and the courts are unable to counterpunch.217
Most presidents, moreover, will engage in inaction. Liberal presidents
generally desire a smaller federal role with respect to criminal law and so-
cial–moral issues.218 Conservative presidents usually prefer that the federal
government pursue less economic regulation. On the whole, then, every
president will likely choose “smaller government” in some policy realms,
resulting in a government that substantially under-enforces rights and privi-
leges relative to what Congress has authorized through legislation. Of course,
a future president can always decide to start enforcing a law again. But as-
suming that not every nonenforcement decision will be reversed by the next
president with different ideological preferences, over time the net effect will
be a growing bias toward less governmental action. Furthermore, even if
every decision not to enforce the law were eventually reversed, the period
during which a law is not enforced would amount to a unilateral four- or
eight-year repeal that would contribute to the bias we have identified.
The asymmetry is further exacerbated by the intertemporal nature of
the relationship between the branches and by the fact that government is
often divided between the two major parties.219 Most laws on the books to-
day were enacted by a past Congress, which means that past Congresses
established most of the statutory baselines. Of course, it is possible that the
current Congress shares the values of the enacting Congress and that it will
attempt to apply the (albeit weak) checks available to combat inaction. But it
is just as likely that the current Congress will be indifferent to (or even
support) the new president’s policies.220 It is therefore unclear whether the
current Congress will be inclined to ensure that its predecessors’ laws are
enforced. Assuming that Congress’s ability to act is a scarce resource—or
even simply that the legislature’s institutional preferences change over
time—a system that forces the current Congress to intervene to protect the
desires of a past Congress will prove a formidable barrier that further en-
ables presidents to pursue inaction.221 The point is essentially one of burden
217. See discussion supra Part III (arguing that the courts and Congress lack the practical
ability to check presidential inaction).
218. Cf. Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime 44 (2007) (describing campaign
promises to strengthen the war on crime by Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Bush Sr.); Frances
Fitzgerald, A Disciplined, Charging Army, New Yorker, May 18, 1981, at 53, available at http://
www.newyorker.com/archive/1981/05/18/1981_05_18_053_TNY_CARDS_000336703
(describing the rise of the New Right and Ronald Reagan, who wanted federal laws that pro-
tected conservative social values).
219. Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 27, at 2330, 2338 (discussing the functional effects
on separation of powers when the three branches of government are unified under one party
rather than divided).
220. Compare, for example, our discussion about budgetary priorities, supra Section
III.B.2.
221. Consider the alternative, a hypothetical world in which the president had to seek
Congress’s affirmative approval to rescind legislation. In this world, the costly behavior is
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shifting, but the effect—as in other constitutional instances222—is signifi-
cant: on balance, more and more laws that Congress has enacted will not be
enforced.
This bias does not result from new political alliances or shifting public
preferences alone. Instead, it is structural and deeply ingrained in the way
the branches interact with each other. By failing to provide meaningful
checks on inaction, the prevailing theory of the separation of powers places a
thumb on the scale in favor of less government intervention than Congress
intended.
B. Objections and Responses
We can imagine three significant objections to our argument concerning
structural bias. The first is that inaction will not occur all that often because
it is only reactive, not proactive. The second is that because the Constitution
is a libertarian document, it is actually meant to favor stasis.223 The third,
which we call the “Goldilocks” objection, is that the mechanism we have
identified merely counteracts an otherwise overactive executive branch,
which should result in just about the “correct amount” of government ac-
tion in the end.
1. Inaction Is Reactive
The first objection is the easiest to dispose of. As we have already men-
tioned, it is of course true that a president may only use inaction to thwart
Congress’s affirmative plans, not to put his own plan into motion. In this
sense, a president may only employ inaction responsively, not proactively,
and this limits his ability to intrude on legislative power through inaction.
By contrast, when the president overreaches by interpreting broadly Con-
gress’s delegation or his own constitutional authority, he can pursue an un-
bounded set of policymaking options.
repeal, and thus it is likely that only those situations where the current Congress truly does not
care about the prior Congress’s preferences will result in a repeal. In all other instances, in-
cluding where the current Congress is of mixed opinion about the past Congress’s preferences,
the legislation will stand. Most crucially, these middle cases are where the current system
enables further inaction.
222. For example, the First Amendment especially disfavors prior restraints, not because
they are substantively more restrictive of speech but because they shift the burden of proof
from the censor to the speaker. On the margin, by placing the burden on the censor, speech
will be more protected. Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Con-
temp. Probs. 648, 648, 657 (1955).
223. See Lawson, supra note 52, at 1233. But see Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Consti-
tution (2005) (arguing that the Constitution is a deeply liberal document in many ways).
This is not to say, of course, that a liberal document necessarily cannot be a libertarian one.
Nevertheless, Professor Amar’s reading thoughtfully elucidates the idea that the Constitution
was a practical document, one meant to enable the federal government to govern properly.
Because such governance generally entails action, Amar’s reading is generally inconsistent with
libertarian readings of the Constitution.
May 2014] Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers 1241
This may have been true in Madison’s day, and it may even be true in
the abstract today. But the argument does not hold water in the real world.
Although opportunities for aggrandizement through excessive action may be
more prevalent than opportunities for overreaching through inaction, this
does not necessarily mean that inaction is not widespread. To the contrary,
we have identified multiple high-profile instances of inaction just from the
past ten years, in areas ranging from the environment to civil rights to crim-
inal law. There is little doubt that inaction is becoming pervasive, even if it is
reactive.
Indeed, the scope of modern administration gives the president unprec-
edented opportunities to make policy through inaction. Because so much of
what the modern federal government does happens by delegation to the
executive branch and because the government has its hand in virtually every
aspect of modern life, the opportunities for a president to use inaction to
thwart the will of Congress are numerous and growing. In other words, be-
cause Congress has a will—and has legislated—on everything under the sun,
from criminal law to welfare to marriage, it is not particularly important
that inaction is reactive. Of course, there are limits to what a president can
accomplish through inaction; for example, he could not achieve the specific
goal of universal government-run health care without some enabling legisla-
tion. Still, if the president is able to use inaction—even as a “reaction”—in
every policy realm, then he can thwart Congress’s will with respect to large
swathes of federal policy.
This objection does have some merit: inaction is inherently reactive,
and, as a theoretical matter, this characteristic could limit the problems
raised by presidential inaction. As a practical matter, however, that limita-
tion has lost virtually all of its effect.
2. The Constitution Is a Libertarian Document
Although the “libertarian” objection—that the Constitution was meant
to put a thumb on the scale, to create a bias against government interven-
tion—goes to the very heart of American constitutionalism,224 it too comes
up short. The Constitution’s libertarian principles are fully accounted for in
the formal requirements of bicameralism and presentment. The Constitu-
tion does not say much about the rules of Congress, but it does provide that
both houses of Congress must pass a law, that the executive may veto the
law, and that Congress may override this veto.225 These rules (along with the
modern vetogates) were designed to slow the pace of legislation and to allow
each branch to have its say.226 But once a bill makes it through the many
structural barriers in Congress and is signed into law by the president (or
Congress overrides the veto), Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution dictates
224. And thus a satisfying response to this objection lies beyond the scope of this Article.
225. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
226. Cf. supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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that it is the law of the land and merits full enforcement by the chief execu-
tive (subject, of course, to resource constraints). In light of these constitu-
tional procedures, it would be incorrect to say that inaction serves the goals
of the founding document.227
Others have argued that inaction might be thought of as a check on a
Congress acting beyond its constitutional authority—for example, by pass-
ing legislation without the constitutional authority to do so. In other words,
inaction can protect the separation of powers, prompting the other branches
of government to assume their proper roles.228 This may be a true statement
of the way government works, but it is also aconstitutional. As a formal
matter, nothing in the Constitution’s text or structure permits the president
to conjure a way to counteract Congress out of thin air. Nor can inaction be
justified on functional grounds: even if it is true that inaction does allow the
president to check Congress, this check is not itself subject to any counter-
weight. Because it is difficult for the coordinate branches to fight back
against inaction, one cannot plausibly argue that inaction is the kind of
check the Constitution calls for.229
In short, the Constitution does not condone unilateral inaction. If a
president does not want to enforce a law, he has an acceptable avenue availa-
ble: he can advocate for its repeal. But he may not disregard it.
227. Moreover, there is a puzzling element to this objection even as a matter of constitu-
tional originalism. Much of what makes presidential inaction constitutionally troubling—the
unchecked power it vests in the executive—is a consequence of the modern administrative
state. The objector must therefore be implying that we should take the Framers to have sup-
ported this outcome because it accords with their libertarian values, notwithstanding the fact
that they could have never conceived of the administrative state. Not only is this implausible as
a matter of specific intent, but the opposite is true: separation of powers—the foundational
principle of the Constitution and the insight of its primary author—is about making sure that
a single branch neither dictates national policy nor encroaches on the authority of the other
branches, even if the policy accords with a general Burkean notion of deliberateness. Congress
can, of course, set national policy in motion by passing laws and appropriating money for
enforcement, but it does not unilaterally dictate national policy; each of these decisions is
subject to checks, including the president’s veto power and his power to direct the agencies to
interpret and enforce the law, not to mention judicial review. This Article attempts to advance
that foundational principle and to reconcile it with the modern administrative state.
228. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, On Constitutional Disobedience (2012) (arguing,
generally, that a president may refuse to enforce certain laws as a constitutional tool to
counteract a gridlocked Congress).
229. A third (and perhaps even less plausible) form of the argument might go as follows:
Inaction is not only useful to check unconstitutional congressional actions. It might also sim-
ply be an effective tool for the president to rein in legislative initiatives he thinks are ill-
advised. But while constitutional realists might welcome the asymmetry we have identified,
they would almost certainly have to pick their cases carefully. A conservative might laud Presi-
dent Bush’s decision not to enforce the Voting Rights Act rigorously, for example, but the
tables can turn quickly: by 2009, it would have been social liberals who were promoting Presi-
dent Obama’s inaction on immigration or marijuana. The point is this: one will not always
support the inaction president, so this objection can be nothing more than an ad hoc conten-
tion that the ends justify the means in some cases (or even all cases while one’s preferred party
is in power). As such, the argument is not responsive to any enduring constitutional question.
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3. The “Goldilocks” Argument: Inaction Produces
Just the Right Amount of Government Intervention
Self-styled constitutional purists might welcome the asymmetry we have
identified. Inaction, they might argue, simply brings us back to the golden
days of the new Republic—or at least the Lochner Era230—by limiting the
scope of federal intervention to a more “appropriate” level. The argument
goes as follows: even if one accepts that inaction will produce a structural
bias against future government intervention, the effect is not “too little” gov-
ernment. Rather, it is a rough counterbalance to government overreach that
yields the “right-sized” government relative to what Congress actually
intended.
This “Goldilocks” argument might look for support to Professor
Mashaw, who describes how the structure of the separation of powers has
allowed the executive to become bigger than Congress initially intended.231
Mashaw explains the rise of the administrative state as following from the
power of the president’s veto. Assume that Congress initially only meant to
authorize an executive agency to monitor three categories of business, and
for an initial period of time, the agency complies. At some point, though,
the agency oversteps its authority and decides to monitor a new (and re-
lated) category of business. Congress could theoretically pass legislation clar-
ifying that this action is not within the power of the agency. The president,
however, would likely veto any such legislation, as it would constrain his
branch’s overall power. Thus, Congress must accept the agency’s overreach-
ing, unless it can muster enough votes to override the president’s veto. Be-
cause congressional override of a veto is comparatively rare, the net result is
that agency overreaching goes unchecked, and the administrative state
grows.232
Mashaw’s theory is an elegant one, and we do not consider it an objec-
tion to our fundamental claim. We do not, after all, intend to argue that the
structural bias that we have identified justifies an inference about how much
overall government intervention there should be. There are many factors at
play in our constitutional scheme, some pushing in favor of smaller govern-
ment and some pushing against.233 We have tried to suggest that a president
will face few obstacles in regulating less than Congress intended, a bias that
is contrary to what the Constitution should permit. Mashaw has also out-
lined a bias that is contrary to what the Constitution should permit. Unless
230. See generally Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitu-
tional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (discussing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
and the controversial Supreme Court decisions invalidating federal and state regulatory stat-
utes in the period following Lochner).
231. See Mashaw, supra note 11, at 193.
232. See id.
233. An example already discussed in this Article is the vetogates theory, which argues
that the many constitutional and institutional constraints of the legislative process will always
produce less legislation (and thus presumably smaller government) than would result in their
absence. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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the reader simply objects that two wrongs make a right234—that the two
biases, pushing in opposite directions, will produce the amount of regula-
tion Congress intended—this objection adds nothing. Indeed, the observa-
tion that a breakdown in the separation of powers has allowed the executive
branch to become more active and to grow remains a sound one. We have
simply argued that it is critical to consider the other side of the ledger: how a
breakdown in separation of powers has allowed the executive branch to
atrophy.
C. Creating Robust Checks on Inaction
Institutional designers need not be resigned to this fate. Although the
structural bias inherent in modern separation-of-powers law—and the re-
forms that might combat it—is likely to garner the most interest from con-
stitutional lawyers and scholars, the functional similarities between
presidential inaction and affirmative overreaching point in other directions
as well. Particularly when it comes to the relationships among the executive
branch, Congress, the courts, and the states, pushing beyond the antiquated
focus on action yields useful insights into both doctrine and institutional
design.
Although scholars might first focus on a doctrinal solution to the inac-
tion problem, we have made the case that judicial review is unlikely to be
successful for several fundamental reasons.235 The best way to escape the bias
built into our constitutional system, then, is to think about separation of
powers not at the level of constitutional doctrine but at the level of institu-
tional design. Rehabilitating Congress (and, in some very narrow situations,
the courts) as a robust adversary to the president—drawing particularly, but
not exclusively, on what Professor Chafetz calls Congress’s “soft power”236—
may be the only solution.237
234. We doubt the objector would take this position, as the assumption of equivalence is a
subject of scholarly inquiry itself. Borrowing from another field, the existence of monopolies is
generally thought to reduce output in a way that detracts from social welfare. If a good im-
poses negative externalities not properly accounted for in its price, however, there will be
excess output relative to the socially optimal level. Now imagine a good that reflects both
forces: oil provided by the OPEC monopoly. When considering whether the monopoly pro-
duces oil at a level that is socially optimal, it would be simplistic to assume that the two forces
cancel each other out and thus make the answer yes. Rather, the proper scholarly inquiry
would assess the extent of each force. (Credit for this example is due to Professor Markovits,
who made the point in his Federal Income Taxation class at Yale Law School.)
235. See discussion supra Section III.A.
236. Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715 (2012) (discussing the
myriad tools, other than legislation, that Congress has at its disposal in interbranch conflicts).
237. We thus exclude solutions internal to the executive branch. Although administrative
law scholars have offered a number of useful policy proposals that would allow the president to
police the agencies, see, e.g., Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Scrutinizing Inaction,
Huffington Post (July 15, 2010, 12:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-l-
revesz-and-michael-a-livermore/scrutinizing-inaction_b_647603.html, because we focus on
situations in which the president is the one acting out of line, those solutions are inapt.
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Still, the reader must understand that these proposals are preliminary.
The purpose of this Article has been to identify the separation-of-powers
problems inherent in presidential inaction; future work will no doubt pro-
vide the solutions. Nonetheless, in this Section, we suggest a few possible
avenues for reform and discuss the dilemmas that these solutions present.
1. Congress as Legislator
The least ambitious proposal might be to use the unique legislative ca-
pabilities of Congress to overcome the institutional barriers to judicial re-
view of inaction. Most obviously, where the president’s authority (and
obligation) to enforce legislation is concerned, Congress could pass more
specific legislative delegations that require the president to take action. Con-
gress’s delegation to the EPA, at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA, provides a
good example of such specificity. In the Clean Air Act, Congress explicitly
required the EPA to regulate “air pollutant[s] . . . which . . . cause, or con-
tribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare,”238 a mandate the Supreme Court found sufficiently
specific to require executive action on carbon emissions.239
Or take the Impoundment Control Act. In response to President
Nixon’s refusal to spend certain funds Congress had allocated for executive
programs, the legislature passed a new law requiring that allocated funds be
spent; Congress essentially reset the baseline, and the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the new baseline was binding on the president.240 That is, the
president could not refuse to spend the funds, for to do so would be to fall
below the level of enforcement Congress explicitly required.
Under this regime, courts would still ultimately review the executive’s
decisions (as in Massachusetts v. EPA), but Congress would also help to iden-
tify the “case” and draw the hard lines that courts have been unwilling to
address.
2. Remedying Information Asymmetries and Aligning Incentives
Many of the shortcomings in congressional oversight we explored earlier
are, at root, problems of information asymmetry. Initiatives that bring
greater transparency to executive decisionmaking could allow Congress to
act as a meaningful check on inaction. For example, inspired by the REINS
Act, which would limit executive action by requiring both houses of Con-
gress to approve newly promulgated regulations,241 Congress might require
agencies to submit all decisions—including those involving inaction—for
238. Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
239. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also supra note 24.
240. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); see also supra notes 24, 212 and
accompanying text.
241. See Felicia Sonmez, REINS Bill to Expand Congressional Power over Executive Regula-
tions Passed by House, Wash. Post (Dec. 7, 2011, 5:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/2chambers/post/reins-bill-to-expand-congressional-power-over-executive-regulations-
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ratification. If Congress failed to ratify, it would provide the courts with a
justiciable vehicle to adjudicate the underlying issues.242
Of course, any such solution would suffer from many of the same
problems it is intended to combat. For example, even if Congress required
an agency to submit decisions not to act for legislative review, it is unlikely
that Congress would have the motivation or the capacity to review every
such decision. It is perhaps even more unlikely that an agency would submit
willingly to such requests, and the same problem of the missing trigger
arises—to wit, how would the agency (or Congress) decide which decisions
merit reporting? It seems unlikely that anyone—Congress, agency head, or
citizen—would make a federal case out of every decision not to issue a regu-
lation. (What would it mean, for example, to claim that the SEC did not do
enough to go after insider traders on a particular day?243)
Fortunately, the problem is not entirely informational. Indeed, Congress
was aware of the decisions not to enforce the Clean Air Act or certain parts
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and Barbara Walters made the im-
pending showdown on marijuana enforcement a major part of the first news
interview with President Obama after the 2012 election. In fact, in those
high-profile cases, it could be argued that the president’s primary motiva-
tion in pursuing a policy of inaction was to make the issue politically salient.
In these circumstances, where information is not the problem, institutional
designers need to find a way to motivate Congress to step in.
One approach would be to attempt to align the powers of Congress with
results the executive would find detrimental. Conditioned funding may ex-
acerbate the problem of inaction by rewarding presidents who prefer less
government regulation as a general matter, but every chief executive—liberal
or conservative—is invested in maintaining his unitary power over the entire
branch.244 With this insight in mind, Congress could fracture that unitary
authority by contracting outside the administrative state to provide the set
of services that the president is unwilling to provide. The litigation sur-
rounding President Obama’s decision not to defend DOMA is an excellent
example. The administration made it clear that it would not carry out the
duty assigned to it by the Constitution, so Congress responded by hiring
someone not employed by the president—in this case, a private lawyer—to
do the job.245 Congress could also enlist private and public institutions to
enforce agency nonperformance through qui tam actions or other private
rights of action.
Not only does this approach guarantee that duly enacted laws are en-
forced in the end, but it creates a powerful disincentive for the president to
passed-by-house/2011/12/07/gIQAs6VMdO_blog.html (discussing the 2011 version of the
REINS bill).
242. But see Staszewski, supra note 160. Such postregulation oversight may implicate
Chadha’s prohibition against the legislative veto. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
243. We thank David Wishnick for pushing us with this evocative example.
244. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 597.
245. See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text.
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pursue a policy of inaction in the first place. If Congress is waiting in the
wings, ready to act, inaction will be both fruitless with respect to the policy
question at issue (Congress will simply hire someone to do what the presi-
dent is unwilling to do) and counterproductive with respect to the rest of
the president’s power (it will take his unitary authority away).246
3. Cooperative Federalism, but Cooperating with Whom?
Similarly, Congress could profitably look to the states for help enforcing
laws the president chooses to ignore. The potential role of the states as bul-
warks against presidential inaction is a logical outgrowth of Professor
Bulman-Pozen’s suggestion that the states act to “safeguard” the separation
of powers.247 Bulman-Pozen notes that if Congress is not satisfied with the
executive’s performance, it can enlist the states and local governments to
carry out its programs.248 But the states are all the more vital when the presi-
dent chooses to pursue a policy of inaction contrary to the national legisla-
ture’s will. For while Congress can bring to bear all of its institutional power
to prevent the president from acting out of line with its preferences (thus
often making recourse to the states unnecessary), we have argued that Con-
gress cannot do so when the president chooses not to act. Thus, where the
president chooses inaction, the states could take on an even greater role in
helping to implement Congress’s preferred policies.249
More broadly, inaction complicates the traditional debate between ad-
vocates of “cooperative” and “uncooperative” federalism. Cooperative-feder-
alism scholars see the states as allies of the federal government.250 But if the
president chooses to under-enforce a particular congressional enactment,
the simple account of cooperative federalism cannot hold. It can no longer
be the case, after all, that the states and local governments are allies of the
entire federal government; when the president fails to enforce the law, he is
246. This might raise some constitutional concerns but is likely acceptable so long as
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding congressional power to
limit the president’s control over certain administrative agencies), remains good law. Of
course, other concerns may prompt the president to choose not to act even where Congress
threatens to make an end run around his executive authority—there is some evidence that
President Obama knew the Republican Congress would hire an outside lawyer if he failed to
defend DOMA, but he pursued this course nonetheless.
247. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
Colum. L. Rev. 459, 477–98 (2012).
248. Id. at 471–72.
249. The states-as-safeguards solution will necessarily be limited by the doctrine of (field)
preemption. In the Arizona case, for example, the Court struck down the state’s own immigra-
tion provisions in part on the grounds that they were preempted by existing federal law, de-
spite the fact that the president had under-enforced that law. Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492 (2012). Moreover, all of the usual concerns about commandeering apply. See, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the federal government may not
commandeer state officers to enforce federal statutes).
250. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813 (1998).
1248 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:1195
by definition at odds with Congress. If the states are to cooperate with the
federal government in a world of inaction, then, they must often choose
sides.
In another sense, inaction also complicates the account of those partial
to uncooperative federalism—most notably Professors Gerken and Bulman-
Pozen—who argue that the states can influence federal activity by asserting
their own authority (the “power of the servant”) to check the federal gov-
ernment.251 While Gerken and Bulman-Pozen see the states and local gov-
ernments as challengers to federal policy, a jurisdiction may use its position
as servant to pull the federal government more in line with its own prefer-
ences. But where the president chooses not to enforce a federal law, the role
of the states and localities will be at once broader (in the sense that they may
voice their preference by cooperating with Congress and forsaking the presi-
dent) and narrower (if the state wants to signal its approval of the presi-
dent’s agenda, there will be fewer opportunities to do so where the president
implements his preferred policies by not acting and, further, not asking the
states to act).
The recent controversy surrounding Arizona’s strict immigration law,
known as S.B. 1070, usefully illustrates the role of inaction in federalism. In
response to the federal government’s suit seeking to prevent the state from
enforcing its own law aimed at strengthening immigration enforcement, Ar-
izona argued that it was simply “supplement[ing]” federal immigration en-
forcement in order to effectuate the will of Congress.252 The Justice
Department, on behalf of the president, argued that, to the contrary, Ari-
zona’s law frustrated Congress’s purpose, which was to grant the president
discretion to enforce the immigration laws as he sees fit.253 The key, though,
is precisely that: Congress’s intent. If it was Congress’s intent that the presi-
dent enforce federal immigration law to the fullest extent possible, advocates
of the states-as-safeguards solution might suggest that Arizona be allowed to
enforce its own law because where the president refuses to carry out Con-
gress’s policies, the body’s power to get what it wants is at its lowest ebb. If
the legislature instead intended to grant the president broad discretion, the
state’s role would have to be more limited. Perhaps a better approach, then,
would be to require that Congress affirmatively ask the states to take on a
more constructive role if that is what it wants. For example, it could ask the
states not to pass their own immigration laws but to agree to enforce the
federal laws currently on the books. Such a solution would serve both as an
information-forcing mechanism (by forcing Congress to state its intent in
actionable terms) and a tool for Congress to keep the president in line (by
251. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Essay, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
Yale L.J. 1256, 1258–59 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword:
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 35 (2010).
252. Brief for Petitioners at 14–18, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No.
11-182), 2012 WL 416748, at *14–18.
253. Brief for the United States at 13–15, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)
(No. 11-182), 2011 WL 5548708, at *13–15.
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facilitating interaction between Congress and an alternative prosecutor: the
states).
4. The “Presidential Inaction” Canon
Courts have long considered it appropriate to use their interpretive pre-
rogative to enforce under-enforced constitutional norms.254 This focus on
promoting structural and individual rights through statutory interpretation
has led the courts to impose clear statement rules to enforce several founda-
tional principles, including federalism,255 democracy,256 and due process.257
Most relevant here, though, the Supreme Court has sought to enforce the
separation of powers through a presumption against congressional disrup-
tion of the traditional balance of power.258 If the Court has in the past inter-
preted statutes with the goal of protecting the separation of powers, it
should be but a small step to integrate our theory of inaction into this juris-
prudence. In hard cases—those in which the president uses his interpretive
authority to pursue a policy that falls short of a congressional baseline or in
which it is not clear what that baseline is—judges could enforce the separa-
tion-of-powers norm by placing a thumb on the scale in favor of enforce-
ment. In this way, courts could allow Congress to avoid many of the
problems outlined above while still permitting the elected branches to pur-
sue a joint policy of under-enforcement if that is their collective goal.259
Massachusetts v. EPA once again may be the best example of such a case.
By requiring the EPA to promulgate environmental regulations, the Court
put the question of inaction back in the hands of the legislature. Had the
Court instead required that Congress police the president’s decision not to
254. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 285–89
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992).
255. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (“If Congress
intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’ ”
(quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985), superseded by statute,
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845)).
256. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (2009) (col-
lecting state cases in which judges have placed a thumb on the scale in favor of access to the
ballot, among other democratic values).
257. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 254, at 600–03 (arguing that the Supreme
Court has enforced due process norms through its reliance on the rule of lenity and the rule
favoring liberal interpretation of statutes meant to protect discrete and insular minorities).
258. Id. at 604–07 (discussing the Court’s presumptions against “derogation of the Presi-
dent’s traditional powers” and “excessive congressional delegation of its own lawmaking
powers”).
259. It seems odd, at first, to hold out the courts as the last hope. After all, we have argued
at some length that the courts are institutionally ill suited to combat inaction. This does not
mean that judges can never step in, however, and a rule of interpretation that makes judicial
involvement more likely would be at worst a wash and at best a useful tool in the anti-inaction
arsenal.
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regulate by passing new, more specific enabling legislation or cutting fund-
ing for one of the president’s favored projects, it would have been left essen-
tially impotent to combat the president’s decision.260 But rather than relying
on Congress to police President Bush’s decision not to act, the Court al-
lowed room for the president to pursue his policy if Congress acquiesced
through a clearer statement that such inaction was statutorily acceptable. A
presumption in favor of enforcement would go a long way toward amelio-
rating the structural bias at the heart of the constitutional case against
inaction.
Conclusion
We live in an era of “presidential lawmaking.”261 This insight is not new.
Theorists, however, have failed to realize that presidential lawmaking can
take a particularly insidious form: the decision not to enforce laws that Con-
gress has duly passed. Once one recognizes this shortcoming, it becomes
possible to identify new rules, institutions, and doctrine that would more
effectively serve the goals of the separation of powers.
Recognizing and beginning to combat unchecked presidential inaction
are even more important as the modern government has become one of
“presidential administration.”262 Strong presidents who are willing, and now
able, to make policy through their agencies will only exacerbate the pathol-
ogy of presidential inaction, rendering antiquated our notion of the presi-
dent and Congress in dialogue.
It is only a small step, then, to realize the challenge unchecked presiden-
tial inaction poses for Madison’s ideal of separated powers. If the modern
government is to be one of true checks and balances, then scholars, judges,
and legislators alike will have to recognize that inaction is a real and growing
problem in need of a solution.
260. See supra Section III.B.
261. Greene, supra note 9, at 123–24.
262. Kagan, supra note 190, at 2246.
